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This thesis elaborates the creation of value in private equity and in particular analyzes value 
creation in 3G Capital’s acquisition of Burger King. In this sense, a specific model is applied 
that composes value creation into several drivers, in order to answer the question of how value 
creation can be addressed in private equity investments. Although previous research by 
Achleitner et al. (2010) introduced a specific model that addresses value creation in private 
equity, the respective model was neither applied to an individual company, nor linked to 
indirect drivers that explain the dynamics and rationales for the creation of value. In turn this 
paper applies the quantitative model to an ongoing private equity investment and thereby 
provides different extensions to turn the model into a better forecasting model for ongoing 
investments, instead of only analyzing a deal that has already been divested from an ex post 
perspective. The chosen research approach is a case study about the Burger King buyout that 
first includes an extensive review about the current status of academic literature, second a 
quantitative calculation and qualitative interpretation of different direct value drivers, third a 
qualitative breakdown of indirect drivers, and lastly a recapitulating discussion about value 
creation and value drivers. Presenting a very successful private equity investment and 
elaborately demonstrating the dynamics and mechanisms that drive value creation in this case, 
provides important implications for other private equity firms as well as public firms in order 
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1.1 Contextualization and Relevance of the Problem 
In line with the current peak in worldwide mergers and acquisitions activity, the volume of 
private equity investments dramatically surged in the first half of the year 2015. The Global 
M&A deal making totaled US$2.2 trillion after the first two quarters in 2015, whereas, financial 
sponsor1 deal volume reached US$413 billion in the same time period, which accounts for 
approximately 18,5% of total M&A deal volume. Mainly driven by a boost in deals with a 
volume of over $5 billion, this respectively equals a 40% increase for global M&A deal volume, 
and beyond that a 49% increase in financial sponsor activity compared to the previous year 
20142. Not only due to the absolute growth rates of private equity investments, but also given 
the relative proportion to overall M&A volume, it appears as private equity is back on track. 
After tumbling in the post- financial crisis era, the year 2014 was the strongest year since the 
all-time record year of private equity in 20073.  
Yet, despite the recent and former success story of private equity, the question if LBOs create 
value and achieve superior returns is discussed contradictorily within existing academic 
research. Recent papers by Achleitner et al. (2011) and Acharya et al. (2012) found that private 
equity houses achieve higher financial risk-adjusted returns for their portfolio companies, 
compared to their public peers. In contrast, a previous study by Kaplan & Schoar (2005) found, 
that average buyout funds return’s, net of fees, are not substantially exceeding the average S&P 
500 returns. However, results are reported to be highly heterogeneous, as fund size and 
maturity, are reported to be contributing factors to positive fund performance.  
The past twenty-five years have seen increasingly rapid and diverse advances in the field of 
value creation and sources of value in leveraged buyouts. On the one hand, Jensen (1989) shows 
how substantial leverage can be a valid explanation for value creation in LBOs. On the other 
hand, parallel research by Kaplan (1989b) and Lichtenberg & Siegel (1990) reports that 
operating performance and productivity are predominant explanations for value creation in 
private equity investments. More recent developments in the field of leveraged buyouts and 
private equity, have led to a renewed interest in creation of value as well as it’s different drivers. 
As increased regulation derogates outrageous leverage ratios in today’s LBO transactions, 
                                                
1 Note that LBO or private equity firms are frequently named as financial sponsors. 
2 Thomson Reuters (2015): Mergers & Acquisitions Review – First Half 2015. 




operational performance improvement is becoming increasingly relevant, in both, academic 
papers and practitioner’s reviews4 (Guo et al. 2011; Acharya et al. 2012).  
The following paper, will analyze the question of how value creation can be assessed in private 
equity investments and what are thereby the main drivers of value creation. Hence, the 
following research question is formulated: 
RQ1: How to assess value creation in private equity investments 
The primary relevance of this paper is to apply the value creation model of Achleitner et al. 
(2010) on a single company. By analyzing the research question by means of the Burger King 
example, it will be shown that value creation is not purely a matter of tax benefits due to high 
leverage ratios, but rather a more complex construct that includes many different drivers on 
different levels. The problem of former models that analyze value creation in the private equity 
context is that operational and financial risk are not separately analyzed. Applying the value 
creation model of (Achleitner et al. 2010; Achleitner & Capital Dynamics 2009), allows to 
separate returns that are attributable to leverage, from unlevered returns. Additionally, the direct 
drivers are complemented by an analysis of indirect drivers that seek to explain the resulting 
direct drivers.  
Moreover, as Shimizu et al. (2004) already suggested years ago that learning from successful 
mergers can be a relevant source of competitive advantage, the aim of this paper is to show how 
a successful private equity transaction can create value. On this note managerial 
recommendation will be inferred that might also be transferable and applicable in other cases. 
The relevance of this paper is first of all to correctly apply the Achleitner et al. (2010) model 
on one specific deal and thereby showing different drivers of value creation. Moreover, it will 
be complemented by analyzing and interpreting “indirect drivers” (Loos, 2005) that seek to 
explain how value can be created from an operational perspective.  
  
                                                




1.2 Justification of the Theme Selection 
To the author’s knowledge, the acquisition of Burger King had not yet been subject to any form 
of analysis in academia. Alongside, the selection of 3G Capital’s acquisition of Burger King as 
a demonstrating example for value creation and the related drivers has several other 
justifications, as follows.  
Firstly, due to the private equity firm, 3G Capital, which is based in Rio de Janeiro and was 
amongst others founded by Brazil’s richest businessman Jorge Paulo Lemann. The past 
acquisitions of Burger King and H.J. Heinz Company, already helped to elevate the name of 
3G Capital across the front pages of global business news. Yet, the recent add-on acquisitions 
of Kraft Foods and Tim Hortons and the subsequent mergers that were completed in 
cooperation with Warren Buffets Berkshire Hathaway, forming respectively, the Kraft Heinz 
Company and Restaurant Brands International, left no doubts that 3G Capital is one of the big 
players in today’s world of private equity. Besides the aforementioned deals, associates of 3G 
Capital are also major shareholders in the world’s largest beer brewer, Anheuser-Busch InBev, 
and highly involved in the ongoing take-over of SABMiller5.  
Second, the acquisition of Burger King was chosen due to the time frame, data availability and 
structure of the acquisition. As the acquisition was completed in October 2010, roughly six 
years ago, it seems to be a good point in time to draw an intermediate conclusion about the 
value that was created through the previous buyout. Moreover, the deal offers wide access to 
publicly available data, since 3G Capital, reoffered parts of Burger King on the stock exchange, 
only a few years after its delisting. Also the structure of the deal is favorable to analyze the 
different levers of value creation, on the one hand due to the usage of a significant amount of 
leverage. The company was acquired for about US$ 4 billion in 2010 including debt, whereas 
an estimated 70% of the purchase price was financed by debt6. On the other hand, due to 3G 
Capital’s reputation of substantially restructuring and improving the operations of its portfolio 
companies7. 
In 2014, Burger King acquired the Canadian company Tim Hortons, mainly financed by 3G 
Capital and Warren Buffet’s Berkshire Hathaway. After the announcement of the acquisition, 
but before the completion, Burger King’s stock closed with a total market capitalization of 
almost US$11 billion, which compared to the initial offer price, indicates a substantial amount 
                                                
5 Bloomberg Business (2015): Ab InBev Buys SABMiller for $107 Billion as U.S. Deal Agreed. 
6 Reuters (2010): Burger King agrees to $3.3 billion sale to 3G Capital. 




of value that may have been created. Despite, the vast synergy potential that arose due to the 
formation of Restaurant Brands International, an entity that combines Burger King and Tim 
Hortons, the following paper will only analyze the value creation of Burger King on a stand-
alone basis.  
1.3 Structuring of the Paper  
After the introduction, this paper begins by visualizing the most important theoretical concepts 
that are relevant for this work. This includes a general overview about private equity, followed 
by an introduction to the Burger King acquisition, including the most important actors, namely 
Burger King and 3G Capital. The main part of the literature review examines different value 
drivers in private equity that are either direct or indirect. Going on, the four main propositions 
are illustrated, including their respective expected results. In addition, the methodology part 
explains the used method, the quantitative method that is used to assess individual value drivers 
is particularly explained in detail.  
Moreover, the main part and contribution of this paper is the next part that analyses direct as 
well as indirect value drivers. On the one hand, direct drivers are not only qualitatively 
explained for the Burger King deal, but also quantitatively processed. Indirect drivers on the 
other hand are rather difficult to quantify. Since they are only indirectly creating value and 
thereby most likely have a positive impact on one or several direct drivers itself, they will be 
qualitatively assessed based on the Burger King deal (Loos 2005; Berg & Gottschalg 2005). 
Finally, the paper is completed with a final discussion that debates value creation and its 
assessment in the Burger King deal. For a comprehensive structure of the paper, please refer to 





2 Literature review and theoretical development  
The theoretical and literature section of this paper, begins with an overview about terms and 
dynamics within the field of private equity. Besides, an overview about the participants, 
background and course of the Burger King deal is provided. Thereafter, this section is structured 
as depicted in Appendix 2, which constitutes the different levels of value drivers that are 
subsequently analyzed.  
2.1 Understanding private equity 
The intrinsic denotation of the term private equity is equity capital that is not publicly listed on 
a stock exchange8. Whereas this might also include investments in young companies, as Start-
ups, through venture capital firms or angel investors, this paper will solely focus on private 
equity firms that invest in mature businesses and typically acquire a controlling stake or the 
majority of shares in a company (Loos 2005). The term private equity is often analogously used 
in line with leveraged buyout, which represents the traditional form of private equity9, where 
the investment firm acquires a company or division that is formerly publicly traded. 
Subsequently, the firm is then taking private, by redeeming the outstanding shares from the 
public market (Kaplan and Strömberg 2009). Since the buyout is usually financed by a high 
proportion of debt, this form of transactions is called leveraged buyout. Going forward, we will 
adapt the view of Kaplan & Strömberg (2009), by using the terms leveraged buyout and private 
equity compatibly. 
The organizational form of private equity firms, is typically a limited liability corporation or 
partnership (Kaplan & Strömberg 2009). In line with the partnership designation, investment 
professionals within a private equity firm are often called general partners (GP). The general 
partners, set up the private equity fund and raise equity from investors, the so called limited 
partners (LP) (Sorensen et al. 2014). Private equity funds are ordinarily closed-end10, with a 
time horizon of around 10 to 12 years, meaning that investors normally cannot withdraw their 
initial funds before the maturity date. The GPs subsequently invest the raised funds, during the 
first five years of the fund’s life time, by acquiring a controlling majority position in several 
                                                
8 Investopedia (2015), accessible at http://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/privateequity.asp. 
9 Buyouts concern the most mature form of private equity investments. Other possible areas of private equity 
investments are in increasing maturity order: Seed, Start-Up, Expansion, Replacement Capital and lastly buyouts 
(Loos 2005). 




companies, which they on average hold for around 5 years in their portfolio (Kaplan and Schoar 
2005). Appendix 3 depicts the main steps in a typical buyout process. 
Leveraged buyouts, are further contextualized between Management Buy-outs (MBO) and 
Management Buy-Ins (MBI). In the context of a MBO, the current management of a public 
firm, initiates the process of raising capital from external providers, usually private equity firms, 
to achieve a change of ownership. Correspondingly in the case of a MBI, an external 
management takes over control, by acquiring a majority stake of the target company, with the 
support of a private equity firm11. In order to acquire a company and obtaining a controlling 
majority stake, LBO firms have to pay a premium to the former public target shareholders. A 
study by Bargeron et al. (2008) found that the average premium paid by private equity firms, is 
28,5% above the target market price. This is substantially lower, compared to the premium of 
46,5% that is on average paid by public firms, who engage in strategic acquisitions. A possible 
explanation for this might be that corporate buyers buy different types of firms compared to 
LBO firms (Bargeron et al. 2008). This might be related to the different rationales of both types 
of buyers. Whereas corporate buyers are often aiming towards the realization of synergies, for 
instance through market power or economies of scale and scope (Seth 1990), financial sponsors 
rather look for established firms with “strong, non-cyclical and stable cash-flows with 
significant unused borrowing capacity” (Loos 2005, p.11). 
Depending on the investment strategy, private equity firms hire different kinds of professionals. 
Commonly, they hire professionals with significant investment as well as operational know-
how and industry expertise. On the one hand, if the buyout firm is pursuing a value or organic 
growth strategy, general partners, who previously worked as industry managers or consultants 
are likely to play a significant role in the value creation process. On the other hand, if the firm 
is adopting a buy-and-build12 strategy, the LBO firm might rather rely on professionals that 
were formerly working as bankers or accountants. Buy-and-build strategies might thereby 
involve a less active management approach, then a value or organic growth strategy (Cf. 
Acharya et al. 2012; Achleitner, Betzer & Gider 2010; Loos 2005). 
Moreover, private equity can be categorized to the alternative investment class that for instance 
also includes hedge funds (Jurek & Stafford 2015). The compensation structure of general 
                                                
11 Note that in both, MBOs as well as MBIs, the majority of capital is usually provided by the private equity fund. 
The managers usually solely contribute a fraction of the capital. 
12  A “buy-and-build strategy” is generally pursued through inorganic growth, thereby “financing expansion 




partners in private equity is thereby equal to hedge fund managers, which typically charge a 
fixed management fee of 1,5% to 2% of the total invested capital as well as a 20% profit sharing 
fee, also called incentive fee or carried interest (Sorensen et al. 2014; Jurek & Stafford 2015). 
The carried interest (carry) is often related to the compensation of a call option, as it gives the 
general partner the right to participate in potential value increases in the future13 (Sorensen et 
al. 2014). Given the call option like compensation of general partners14, and the associated 
limited risk of losses in the case of default, critics charge that this might cause another principal 
agent problem between limited partners and investors, as “GPs are prone to overinvestment, 
and potentially will be willing to gamble by taking large levered stakes in portfolio firms” 
(Axelson et al. 2013, p. 2229). 
The aforementioned principal agent problem has been especially critical in the 1980s, when 
leverage ratios surged towards as much as 90% (Guo et al. 2011). As a consequence, many 
leveraged buyouts resulted in bankruptcy, which consequently lead to an intensive slowdown 
in private equity investments during the 1990s. With the beginning of the 21st century, private 
equity accelerated once more, and reached its peak in 2007. Yet, one year later, as a 
consequence of the financial crisis, the private equity market tumbled once more, primarily due 
to the slump of debt markets (Kaplan & Strömberg 2009). However, this time the industry 
recovered rather fast, and seems to be back on track, with 2014 being the strongest year after 
the record year of private equity in 200715. 
2.2 The Burger King buyout 
On October 19th 2010, both 3G Capital as well as Burger King Holdings, Inc. confirmed the 
completion of the transaction, whereby an affiliate of 3G Capital acquired Burger King, 
including its outstanding debt for around $4 billion16. The following paragraphs will introduce 
both of the involved parties, and present the most important occurrences during the pre-
acquisition as well as the post-acquisition stage. 
2.2.1 Burger King Holdings Inc. before the buyout  
Burger King, which is today the second largest fast food chain in the world, was founded in 
1954, when James McLamore and David Edgerton acquired a small burger franchise in Miami. 
                                                
13 pwc (2012): How US private equity compensates management through the investment lifecycle, available at: 
https://www.pwc.com/us/en/hr-management/assets/pwc-how-us-private-equaty-compansates-management.pdf. 
14 General partners usually contribute a small fraction of capital from their own pockets to favorable terms- this is 
called sweet equity. 
15 Thomson Reuters (2014): Mergers & Acquisitions Review – Full Year 2014. 




The company’s growth across the United States was primarily spurred by the success of Burger 
King’s signature burger, called the Whopper17. After many changes of ownership with various 
diverse corporate owners during Burger King’s history, the company was sold in a leveraged 
buyout in 2002, to a consortium of private equity investors, from its previous owner Diageo, 
which is mainly known for its alcoholic beverages. The private equity consortium, including 
well-known firms as TPG Capital, Bain Capital and Goldman Sachs Capital Partners acquired 
Burger King, for $1,5 billion18 . In 2006, the joined acquisition consortium that involved 
multiple private equity firms, which academic literature names “club bidding” (Marquez & 
Singh 2013), took the firm public in an IPO with an offering share price of $17, whereas only 
69% of the shares were floated to the public and the remaining 31% were kept by the 
consortium19.  
2.2.2 3G Capital - a global investment firm  
3G Capital is a private equity firm that was founded in 2004 amongst others by three of 
Brazilian’s most successful businessmen and investors, namely Jorge Paulo Lemann, 
Alexandre Behring and Marcel Herrmann Telles20. The investment firm is headquartered in 
New York City, and has another office in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil21. According to it’s own 
records, the firm focuses on “long-term value, with a particular emphasis on maximizing the 
potential of brands and businesses”22. The investment firm is nowadays especially known for 
its acquisitions of Burger King and H.J Heinz Company. At the latest, after acquiring and 
combining Kraft Foods with Heinz, thereby founding the Kraft Heinz Company, the name 3G 
Capital resounded throughout the world23 . The transaction was financed and executed in 
cooperation with Berkshire Hathaway’s Warren Buffet. 
2.2.3 The course of the Burger King buyout 
The former CEO and Chairman of Burger King, John Chidsey, referred to 3G Capital’s offer 
to take over Burger King’s outstanding shares, as a “call out of the blue”. The investment firm 
has beforehand offered a price of $24 per share, which equals a 46% premium on Burger King’s 
market price. Whereas the equity investment is worth $3,26 billion, the overall deal including 
                                                
17 About money (2010): History of Burger King. 
18 Altassets (2010): TPG, Bain, Goldman exit Burger King as 3G pays $4bn. 
19 Reuters (2010): Burger King agrees to $3.3 billion sale to 3G Capital. 
20 Note that the other founding partners are Carlos Alberto da Veiga Sicupira and Roberto Moses Thompson Motta. 
21 Bloomberg (2015): http://www.bloomberg.com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapId=23471434. 
22 Heinz Group (2015): http://news.heinz.com/press-release/finance/hj-heinz-company-and-kraft-foods-group-
sign-definitive-merger-agreement-form-k. 




debt is estimated to be worth $4 billion. An analyst from the Telsey Advisory Group 
commented that the offered price seems to be a good deal for Burger King’s shareholders. 
According to other market experts the valuation seemed to be very high, yet, it was noted that 
there might exist the potential to significantly improve Burger King, while being a private 
company24. At the time of the acquisition Burger King was experiencing difficulties, not only 
due to the impact of the financial crisis, but also since as some critics commented, the previous 
investment consortium, exploited Burger King as a “cash cow”25. This might in parts explain 
the market price before the announcement of the acquisition, when shares were short around 
31% compared to the end of the year 2008. In comparison, the shares of Burger King’s biggest 
rival, McDonalds, were up by around 18%26. Since Burger King, was previously controlled by 
another PE firm, or rather a small pool of firms, the buyout can be further specified as a 
secondary buyout (SBO)27. 
2.2.4 The post-acquisition phase 
After the completion of the merger, the managing partner of 3G Capital stated: “We are excited 
to work together with the company’s employees and franchises to continue to invest in the 
brand for the benefit of all its guests, employees and franchises”28. With the holding of 3G 
Capital, many things changed in the following years. The most obvious change was the sale of 
around 1.300 company owned restaurants between 2010 and 2013. Thereby, the overall number 
of restaurants declined from 1.344 to only 52 proprietary restaurants. The total number of 
restaurants in 2013 counted 13.667, with 52 company restaurants and the remainder of 13.615 
restaurants owned by franchises. These previous sell-offs were part of the global “refranchising 
initiative”, which was finalized in 201329. In parallel to making the overall business model 
leaner, with less restaurants directly owned and substantially more franchising, many personal 
changes were effective at Burger King’s corporate offices. In Burger King’s headquarter in 
Miami-Dade County, Florida, the total FTE headcount shrank from around 800 to less than 300 
people30. Besides, none of the former directors of Burger King Holdings, was in office at the 
                                                
24 Reuters (2010): http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/09/02/us-burgerking-idUSTRE6801CB20100902. 
25 NY Times (2012): http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/23/opinion/nocera-burger-king-the-cash-cow.html?_r=0. 
26 Reuters (2010): http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/09/02/us-burgerking-idUSTRE6801CB20100902. 
27 See Arcot et al. (2015) for a detailed analysis of the general mechanisms of value creation in secondary buyouts. 
28 3G Capital company website (2015), accessible at: http://www.3g-capital.com/bkw.html. 
29 Burger King Worldwide Reports: Fourth Quarter and Full Year 2013 Results. 




end of the analyzed holding period, whereas the majority was directly brought in by 3G 
Capital31.  
Another major highlight in the post-acquisition phase was Burger King’s return to the public 
stock markets in 2012, only shortly after going private in 2010. However, the company did not 
choose to go public via a traditional IPO, instead used a “reverse merger” with Justice 
Holdings32. The firm is closely linked to hedge fund manager Bill Ackman and its only purpose 
was to find another business to acquire. In the reverse merger, Justice Holdings bought a 
minority stake (29%) of Burger King from 3G Capital for around $1,4 billion in cash. In turn, 
Justice Holding was delisted in London and in turn again listed at the New York Stock 
Exchange under the name of Burger King with the ticker “BKW”33. Until the end of the 
considered holding period, 3G Capital remained the main and controlling shareholder with 
71%, followed by the hedge fund Pershing Square Capital Management again from Bill 
Ackman, owning approximately 10% of the equity34.  
Given the aforementioned “refranchising initiative”, total revenues were declining during the 
first three years of 3G Capital ownership. This is simply explainable since revenue per company 
restaurant is higher compared to the revenue that is achieved from franchise and property 
payments 35 . The future prospects of the company appear to be good. Due to positive 
comparable sales growth in the last years and system sales growth expected to grow again the 
company is expected to improve the top-line results going forward36. 
2.3 Value creation in Private Equity Investments (LBOs) 
Until today, many attempts have been made to analyze value creation in private equity 
investments. In general, academia differentiates between value creation on the fund level and 
value creation on the transaction level (Achleitner et al. 2010). Several studies have addressed 
fund performance and compared it to public market indices, as for instance Kaplan & Schoar 
(2005), who found that average fund performance is not significantly higher compared to the 
average returns of the S&P 500. More recently published studies, as Phalippou & Gottschalg 
                                                
31 Burger King Worldwide: Annual report (2013) and Burger King Holdings: Annual report (2010). 
32 The Wall Street Journal (2012): Burger King Returns to Public Market on NYSE. 
33 Business Insider (2012): Bill Ackman’s Special Purpose Entity Finally Makes Its Move. 
34 TheStreet (2014): How Burger King’s Brilliant Brazilian Billionaire Turned $1.2B  
35 Burger King evaluates sales according to system sales growth and comparable sales growth: “System sales 
growth refers to the change in sales at all company-owned and franchise restaurants in one period from the same 
period in the prior year. Comparable sales growth refers to the change in restaurant sales in one period from the 
same prior year period for restaurants that have been open for thirteen months or longer.” (Burger King Worldwide 
Reports: Fourth Quarter and Full Year 2013 Results, p.10). 




(2009) and Harris et al. (2014) revealed mixed results for fund performance. From a critical 
perspective, Phalippou & Gottschalg (2009) propose that private equity funds returns after 
accounting for fees, are round 3% below the market returns. Contrary, Harris et al. (2014) 
provide supporting evidence for the hypothesis that private equity funds outperform the S&P 
500 index in turn by 3% annually, whereas Sorensen et al. (2014, p. 1977) remain critical, “if 
this outperformance is sufficient to compensate investors (LPs) for the cost of risk and long-
term illiquidity”. Other scholars, as Kaplan (1989b), Nikoskelainen & Wright (2007), 
Achleitner et al. (2010), Guo et al. (2011), Achleitner et al. (2011), Acharya et al. (2012) and 
Achleitner & Figge (2014) are rather focused on value creation on the transaction level, by 
examining different samples of buyouts. In contrast to academics, who analyze returns on the 
fund level, these authors often seek to understand and explain the drivers of value creation in 
private equity investments.  
Generally speaking, academic literature in the field of buyouts, views the concept of value 
creation from two different perspectives, namely, enterprise value (EV) and equity value. 
Whereas, Nikoskelainen & Wright (2007), measure returns on both dimensions, Achleitner et 
al. (2011) examine value creation from the perspective of the shareholders, therefore measure 
the impact on equity value. This differentiation between equity value and enterprise value is 
important, due to the variety of finance instruments that are used in leveraged buyouts. Thus, a 
buyout might significantly increase the equity value, without enhancing the enterprise value 
(Nikoskelainen & Wright 2007). As general partners in private equity ordinarily try to 
maximize the initial investment of the limited partners, in order to maximize their own carried 
interest, this thesis adapts the view of Achleitner et al. (2011) by focusing on the return on 
equity, when for instance calculating the IRR. 
Empirical academic publications often highlight the importance of individual drivers of value, 
as Muscarella & Vetsuypens (1990), who analyze the value creating impact of operational 
improvements, and Kaplan (1989a), who on the other side explains value creation through tax 
benefits resulting from tax shields when financing a firm with debt. Contrary, academic papers 
exist that offer a broader and holistic spectrum of drivers of value creation (i.e. Acharya et al. 
2010; Achleitner et al. 2010). Besides, Loos (2005) is one of the authors who also offers a 
holistic perspective and condensates value creation in leveraged buyouts between direct and 
indirect drivers. In addition, the author finds that only direct operational drivers actually create 
value, by improving the cash flows of the buyout firm, whereas indirect drivers rather indirectly 




Furthermore, the Ph.D. dissertation of Pindur (2009) decomposes value creation in LBOs into 
five dimensions, which can be categorized into an internal and an external perspective. On this 
note, Pindur (2009) emphasizes that different dimensions are usually interrelated and not 
necessarily mutually exclusive.  
Additionally, Berg & Gottschalg (2005) provide a comprehensive framework that views value 
generation in buyouts from three different dimensions. The first dimension concerns the phase 
where value creation takes place during the buyout. Thereby value creation can already take 
place during the acquisition phase and last through the holding period to the divestment phase. 
In addition, the second dimension analyzes the causes of value generation in buyouts, whereas 
value generation is equated with an increase in equity value during all phases of the buyout. 
Hence, the equity value is calculated as follows: 
 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒	  𝑜𝑓	  𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦	   = 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛	  𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑝𝑙𝑒 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑠 ∗ 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛 − 𝑁𝑒𝑡	  𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡  
According to the authors, Berg & Gottschalg (2005), the valuation multiple, described as 
financial arbitrage is conceptualized as a special form of value generation cause. In opposition 
to the other levers that are characterized as value creation levers, the valuation multiple is 
defined as being value capturing, since it is not affecting the financial performance of the 
company. Furthermore, value creation levers are differentiated according to primary levers and 
secondary levers, comparably to the traditional value chain (Porter 1985; Stabell & Fjeldstad 
1998). Whereas the primary levers, i.e. financial engineering in Appendix 4, have a direct effect 
on financial performance, secondary levers only indirectly affect financial performance through 
one or multiple direct drivers37. To sum up, Appendix 4 shows a comprehensive summary that 
includes all levers of the second dimension and how they can be explained. Lastly, the third 
dimension views the sources of value generation in buyouts. Thereby it is important to 
distinguish between intrinsic and extrinsic generation of value38. On the one hand, intrinsic 
value generation, is a form of value that takes place within the portfolio company, without 
specific influence of the buyout firm. Thus, this kind of value generation would appear in any 
PE investment and does not reflect specific capabilities of the private equity firm, as for instance 
expertise or network. Extrinsic value generation, on the other hand, is attributable to the 
                                                
37 The definition of primary levers and secondary levers is in line with respectively direct drivers and indirect 
drivers, defined by Loos (2005). In the following both terms are applied interchangeable.  
38 Extrinsic and intrinsic value generation of Berg & Gottschalg (2005) are comparable to the internal and external 




capabilities of the buyout firm, and would without the participation of the private equity firm 
not appear in the portfolio firm (Berg & Gottschalg 2005).  
2.4 Direct drivers of value creation 
According to Guo et al. (2011), Acharya et al. (2012) and Achleitner et al. (2011) the most 
common explanations of value in the form of increased returns are: (i) operational performance 
improvement, (ii) higher sector valuation multiples and (iii) the usage of leverage. In line with 
this, Achleitner et al. (2010) provide a comprehensive framework, that allows for a clear 
identification and interpretation of different value drivers. Their model separates the leverage 
effect, from other value drivers, as the effect of operational improvement and the multiple 
effect. This is especially relevant, as previous models did not explicitly differentiate between 
operational and financial risk (Achleitner et al. 2010). In this paper, the following levers are 
normally denominated as direct drivers, yet the terminology might vary in other papers, for 
instance in Berg & Gottschalg (2005), who categorize these drivers in their framework as 
primary levers39. 
2.4.1 Value through leverage 
Leverage as a direct driver of value, is traditionally defined as interest payment deductions or 
“tax benefits from the perspective of the buyout company” Kaplan (1989a, p. 613). These 
benefits occur to the equity holder through tax shields, that increase the return to investors in 
the firm. Higher returns are justified by an increased financial risk that comes with the issuance 
of larger amounts of debt that, help to finance the transaction (Modigliani & Miller 1958). Since 
tax shields, increase free cash flow that is available to equity holders, leverage is likely tohave 
a positive effect on firm value. Whereas no universally accepted ideal level of leverage exists, 
many different theories exist, that conceptualize the ideal capital structure. Tradeoff theory is 
one of the fundamental theories, which suggests that firms need to balance the benefits of tax 
advantages, with the disadvantage of financial distress costs, also known as bankruptcy costs 
(Myers 2001). Contrary, free cash flow theory, another important concept, argues that costs of 
financial distress are negligible, as long as a firm generates significant operating cash flows, 
                                                
39  Berg & Gottschalk (2005) designate the effect of leverage as “financial engineering” and the effect of 
operational improvement as “increasing operational effectiveness”. Both former drivers are categorized as primary 
levers, which will be used interchangeably in this paper with the term “direct driver”. Yet, the framework of Berg 
& Gottschalg (2005) classifies the multiple effect as a “value capturing” driver instead of a value creating primary 
lever.40 These tax payments might for instance favor for instance the respective government. Amongst others, this 
can include, taxes of capital gain, paid by the former pre LBO shareholders and capital gain taxes of the LBO firm 




after financing future investment opportunities with a substantially positive net present value. 
Therefore, free cash flow theory is likely to suggest higher levels of leverage than tradeoff 
theory, especially for mature firms (Myers 2001). However, evidence by Axelson et al. (2013) 
suggests that capital structure in buyouts, is rather influenced by the conditions of the debt 
market, depending on the “price and availability of debt” (Axelson et al. 2013, p. 2264). With 
this in mind, buyouts are more levered when credits are easily available and interest rates are 
in turn low (Axelson et al. 2013). Moreover, Achleitner et al. (2010) suggest that private equity 
firms seem to be able to apply higher leverage ratios, due to their experience and standing in 
the market. Typically, debt to equity ratios decrease in the years after the completion of the 
buyouts, as private equity sponsors use large portions of the generated free cash flow to pay 
back debt (Kaplan 1989a).  
Leverage is certainly the most controversially discussed driver of LBO value creation in 
academic literature. Especially the question if higher leverage ratios create value is subject to 
considerable discussions within academia. In line with Kaplan (1989a), Achleitner et al (2010) 
show that financial engineering on average contributes to about one third of the created value 
in a sample of 206 European buyouts between 1991 and 2005. In addition, more recent work 
by Guo et al. (2011) finds, that increased leverage yields higher tax shields, which in turn result 
in increased cash flows. Additionally, they state, that in general targets with a low debt ratio 
have higher potential for improvements in tax shields, since the higher the increase in leverage, 
the higher the improvements in cash flows, which is comparable to the findings of Renneboog 
et al. (2007). Yet, the magnitude of the effect also highly depends on the maintenance of the 
higher debt ratio after the PE firm exited the investment (Guo et al. 2011).  
On the contrary, Bergström et al. (2007) claim that leverage can from a societal perspective not 
be regarded as a driver for value creation. Thus, according to the authors leverage is rather 
redistributing wealth through the creation of tax shields instead of creating new value. As some 
even argue that the aforementioned tax payments come at the expense of society, Jensen (1989) 
argues that apart from the potential tax deductions, realized by interest tax shields, through 
financial engineering of private equity firms, LBO transactions also come along with the 
creation of new sources of tax40. Finally, it is important to note, that next to the discussed 
financial engineering related benefit of leverage, that is rather mechanical, another rather 
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include, taxes of capital gain, paid by the former pre LBO shareholders and capital gain taxes of the LBO firm due 





behavioral finance related effect exists. This topic is mainly attributable to Jensen (1986) and 
Jensen (1989) who discuss the positive effect of debt on agency costs as well as the motivational 
efficiency impact of debt. 
2.4.2 Value through the multiple effect 
The second main lever of value creation is the multiple effect. The mechanisms behind this 
driver are changes in valuation multiples between the point of entry and exit, keeping all other 
effects constant (Achleitner et al. 2011). Pragmatically formulated, value is created by buying 
cheap and selling more expensive. The multiple effect, also referred to pricing in buyouts, is 
usually analyzed according to the EBITDA/EV multiple, as for instance in Acharya et al. 
(2012). According to Achleitner et al. (2011), EBITDA/EV is the most commonly used multiple 
in private equity. It is measured by the difference in enterprise value through changes in entry 
and exit EBITDA/EV multiples between the entry and the exit date, both respectively 
multiplied with the initial EBITDA value at the entry point. In case the EBITDA/EV multiple 
is higher at the exit of the investment, it appears that value had been created, measured by 
increased returns to equity holders when divesting the asset (Achleitner et al. 2011).  
Academic papers seem to agree that the multiple effect is a justifiable dimension of value 
creation, yet there has been little agreement on the question if improvements are attributable to 
the private equity firm or the overall market conditions (Achleitner at al. 2011). Research by 
Cumming et al. (2007) classifies pre buyout undervaluation of target companies as one of the 
“chief sources of shareholder wealth gains” (Cumming et al. 2007, p. 440). Therefore, spotting 
undervalued targets and as a result paying lower entry multiples, is value creating, presupposed 
that the PE firm achieves a higher exit multiple. More recent evidence by Acharya et al. (2012), 
has examined that the improvement of multiples is higher for PE sponsor’s portfolio companies 
in comparison to publicly traded peers. They classify the multiple effect as one of the main 
“explanatory factors for abnormal performance” (Acharya et al. 2012, p. 371). In accordance, 
Bargeron et al. (2008) show that private equity firms pay substantially lower premiums for their 
acquisitions compared to mergers or acquisitions of public companies. 
Finally, Guo et al. (2011), show that around 20% of buyout returns, in a sample of 192 large 
leveraged buyouts, are attributable to to the increase in valuation multiples during the holding 
period. Kaplan and Strömberg (2009) interpret these findings as the ability of private equity 
firms, to buy firms cheaper compared to strategic bidders. However, higher multiples might not 




undervalued targets, but are also influenced by credit market conditions. Thus, in times of cheap 
borrowing, valuation multiples are likely to be higher than in times of high interest rates (Guo 
et al. 2011). 
2.4.3 Value through operational improvement 
Value creation on the operational dimension, is generally characterized as the improvement of 
operational performance through the active participation of the private equity firm41 (Achleitner 
et al. 2014). Increasing equity returns through the operational improvement of the acquired 
target after the completion of the LBO is one of the most common sources of value creation in 
the field of private equity (Acharya et al. 2012; Bergström 2007). It is comprised of EBITDA 
and/or cash flow enhancing measures as (i) increased revenue, (ii) reduced cost and (iii) 
optimized working capital as well as capital expenditures (Kaplan 1989b, cited after Achleitner 
& Figge 2014). The former two (i) increased revenue and (ii) reduced costs are categorized as 
EBITDA margin improvements42, whereas (iii) working capital and CAPEX optimization is 
classified as a cash flow enhancing driver43.  
A study conducted by Muscarella & Vetsuypens (1990), analyzed 72 LBOs, that were again 
divested by going public between 1983 and 1990. The results show, that these companies on 
average achieved significantly stronger improvements in profitability, compared to publicly 
traded peers that have previously not gone through a leveraged buyout. Cost reduction, were 
particularly mentioned to be the main performance improving measure, within the sample of 
the study, whereas measures as sales growth and streamlining of asset utilization played a minor 
role. Since, LBOs at this time used very high levels of leverage, returns on equity used to be 
very high. Yet, the paper could not show, that LBOs obtain increased returns for their investors 
(Muscarella & Vetsuypens 1990). 
Moreover, Kaplan (1989b) examined a sample of 76 large buyouts, completed in the 1980s, 
that showed positive results of increased market value through operational improvements. The 
study presents significant improvements in operating income and net cash flow, as well as 
decreases in CAPEX, evidently achieved by aligned incentive structures in the post buyout 
                                                
41 This active management or ownership approach is often referred to as “hands-on approach”.  
42 Note that (i) increased revenue and (ii) reduced costs ceteris paribus also increase cash flow through higher 
EBITDA. 
43 In the following, this section differentiates between direct drivers of operational improvement that either create 
value by improving EBITDA itself, usually through reduced costs or higher revenues, or by enhancing and 





period (Kaplan 1989b). Nevertheless, Guo et al. (2011) relativized the aforementioned results, 
in a more recent study with a sample of buyouts, that were executed between 1990 and 2006. 
Even though, their results showed that operating performance in LBOs was equal or slightly 
higher as compared to their respective peer group, the magnitude of improvements was 
substantially smaller than the previously presented results by Kaplan (1989b). Despite the weak 
evidence for performance improvement, Guo et al. (2011) suggest, that value creation may be 
possible through a more efficient utilization of firm assets. For instance, by selling of non-
productive assets, return on assets can be increased, provided that the EBITDA remain stable. 
Furthermore, Achleitner et al. (2011), amongst other, confirm that operational improvements, 
in terms of EBITDA margin improvements and sales growth, create value for equity holders, 
while analyzing a comprehensive dataset of 1980 buyouts between 1986 and 2010. Even 
though, the authors could not confirm that PE sponsors were able to achieve superior sales 
growth compared to their publicly traded peers, they found that increased sales can positively 
influence the exit multiple at the end of the holding period (Achleitner et al. 2011). Accordingly, 
research of Acharya et al. (2012) explored empirical evidence for the operational performance 
improvement by private equity firms. The authors explored a sample of 110 transactions from 
14 different traditional private equity firms, between 1995 and 2005. They found that margin 
improvement and sales growth are linked to superior performance during PE ownership. Yet, 
only the EBITDA margin was improved above the related sector level, whereas they could not 
show that sales growth is significantly improved compared to peers. Ultimately, Acharya et al 
(2012) conclude that operational performance improvements can explain superior returns and 
lead to the creation of financial value. As naturally not all transactions create value, the 
realization of performance improvement often distinguishes successful from unsuccessful 
deals. 
2.4.3.1 EBITDA improvements  
EBITDA is typically used as the foundation for the financial valuation of companies in the field 
of private equity and one of the most used multiples. The fraction of operational value creation, 
that has been achieved through improvements in EBITDA, is conceptualized as the 
improvements in EBITDA within the holding period. As previously mentioned, this can be 
achieved through both higher revenues as well as higher EBITDA margins, by reduced 
operating costs. In practice, EBITDA improvements are typically achieved through a 





The model provided by Achleitner & Capital Dynamics (2009), which is subsequently used to 
analyze the creation of value in the Burger King deal, measures value added by changes in 
EBITDA during the holding period of the private equity firm. Generally speaking, operating 
profits can be increased through cost reductions and sales growth, either organically by growing 
internally or inorganically through external growth. Loos (2005) sees external growth through 
acquisitions as “a key strategy of LBO firms” (Loos 2005, p. 205).  
From an internal growth perspective, private equity firms often rely on industry knowledge and 
operational experience. Thus, most of the leading private equity firms are positioned and 
structured according to key industries (Kaplan & Strömberg 2009). The Carlyle Group, one of 
the largest private equity firms in the world is only one example for a private equity firm that 
is organized around its core industries. The firm specifies its specialization approach according 
to industries as “central to the firm’s ability to create value”. Their “valuing depth over breadth” 
approach includes 11 core industries 44 , from aerospace over financial services to 
transportation45. Moreover, by hiring investment professionals with operational experience and 
industry know-how, or by cooperating with external consulting groups, private equity firms, 
might be able to further improve the operating value of their portfolio companies (Kaplan and 
Strömberg 2009). The private equity firm Clayton, Dubilier & Rice, for instance, closely works 
in cooperation with former industry experts, as Jack Welch, former CEO of General Electrics 
or Sir Terry Leahy, former CEO of Tesco, who both support the firm’s by improving their 
operational engineering46. 
According to Acharya et al. (2012), human capital factors are a dominant feature to explain 
operating profit improvements in private equity investments. They argue that the experience 
and the background of general partners in private equity firms, have an impact on the direction 
and success of value creation. When the partners are former consultants or previous industry 
managers, they are more likely to contribute to positive EBITDA growth of the portfolio 
company through internal improvement programs. By leveraging their skills and industry 
know-how, partners might contribute towards improving sales, by exploring further markets or 
through cost cutting programs. In opposition to partners with operational know-how, general 
                                                
44 The full list of core industries: Aerospace & Defense, Commodities, Consumer & Retail, Energy & Power, 
Financial Services, Healthcare, Industrial, Real Estate, Technology, Telecom & Media, Transportation. 
45 Carlyle Group – our business – industry expertise, viewed at https://www.carlyle.com/our-business/industry-
expertise. 




partners with former experience in banking and corporate finance, are more likely to follow an 
external growth strategy, by acquiring further companies. 
2.4.3.2 Cash Flow improvements  
The effect created by improvements in free cash flow is an operational driver of value creation 
and called the free cash flow effect. Free cash flow can on the firm level be used to pay back 
debt or to distribute to shareholders through dividends and share buybacks. The real lever of 
value creation here is the creation of cash flow, not as often mistakenly stated, the process of 
paying back debt, which is denominated as deleveraging (Achleitner & Capital Dynamics 
2009). Previous research by Lehn & Poulsen (1989) show that there is evidence for higher cash 
flows of firms that have gone private through a leveraged buyout, in comparison to a benchmark 
of firms that stayed public.  
In accordance to the the Achleitner & Capital Dynamics (2009) model, enhanced cash flows 
can be composed of increases in EBITDA, working capital effects, changes in investments and 
depreciation and payment of interest and taxes. Since the mechanisms of EBITDA and leverage 
were already presented previously, this section will illustrate the impact of improved asset 
utilization on cash flows. Achleitner & Figge (2014, p.409) call this “streamlining of capital 
expenditures and working capital. Existing research recognizes the critical role of improved 
asset utilization. Thereafter, cash flows can be improved, by increasing the productivity of 
assets, despite a constant level of profitability, for instance by using working capital more 
efficiently (Guo et al. 2011). Thus, private equity firms reduce working capital of portfolio 
companies during the holding period, primarily by lowering inventory levels and collecting 
receivables more quickly (Easterwood et al. 1989). Correspondingly, Holthausen & Larcker 
(1996) show that firms that have gone through LBOs on average maintain significantly lower 
levels of working capital in comparison to publicly traded peers.  
A much debated question is whether and to what extent the reduction of capital expenditures 
contributes to value creation. While some argue that lower CAPEX increase cash flows, others 
pledge that private equity firms need to guarantee the long run profitability of their investments, 
whereas reductions in capital expenditures can be counter productive and harm the firms in the 
medium- to long-term (Loos 2005). Yet, former research provides evidence for reduced 
investment activities in the post acquisition stage of private equity investments (Cf. Kaplan 
1989b; Smith 1990). Moreover, firms might eliminate “non-productive assets” which may not 




assets (Guo et al. 2011, p. 497). The nature of these asset sales is usually driven by efficiency 
considerations (Seth et al. 1993). 
2.5 Indirect drivers of value creation 
As previously introduced by Loos (2005), indirect drivers are less directly enhancing value, 
since they are not visibly increasing cash flows or EBITDA, which makes it very difficult to 
measure them. Yet, they play a major role in the entire value creation process of LBOs, due to 
their likely interdependence with direct drivers and ability to impact direct drivers, which in 
turn enhances operational performance. This is in line with Berg & Gottschalg (2005) who 
explain, that indirect drivers, which they define as secondary levers, do not have a direct impact 
on financial performance, yet they contribute to value creation through direct levers and 
therefore help to explain value creation in LBOs.  
Typically, academic literature, views the following indirect drivers as (i) changes in corporate 
governance, (ii) alignment of management incentives, (iii) leverage as a form of controlling 
managerial behavior and (iv) culture and form of communication (Kaplan & Strömberg 2009; 
Loos 2005; Achleitner & Figge 2004). This paper will mainly discuss the former two, corporate 
governance and management incentivizing, as they are likely to have the biggest impact in the 
case of Burger Kings acquisition.  
2.5.1 Corporate governance  
Due to different corporate governance practices around the world, various different definitions 
and conceptualizations of corporate governance exist. Desender et al. (2013, p. 823) describe 
corporate governance as “a system of interrelated practices having strategic or institutional 
complementarities, where governance practices will be effective only in certain combinations”, 
based on various authors that previously defined the concept of corporate governance. In line 
with these findings, Rediker & Seth (1995) claim that effective control through monitoring is 
very likely attributable to a simultaneous combination of governance mechanisms, instead of 
only a single one. Moreover, Capron & Guillén (2009, p. 805) conceptualize corporate 
governance as “the allocation of rights and obligations among the firm’s stakeholders, including 
shareholders, managers, workers, and others with a stake in the corporation.”  
Furthermore, the concept of corporate governance is closely related to the principal-agent 
theory. This theory describes the situation where a principal contracts an agent to perform a 
certain task, thereby delegating the right to make certain decisions to the agent. Under the 




sometimes diverge from the best interest of the principal (Jensen & Meckling 1976). This 
phenomenon of agency conflicts is especially applicable in public firms, where interests 
between the shareholders (principal) and managers (agents) are often divergent. Amongst 
others, corporate governance is one of the most frequently discussed theories, that antagonizes 
the agency conflict. Thereby, the corporate governance mechanisms assist to reduce the agency 
problem by supervising management, as for instance through board control, direct shareholder 
supervision and external auditors (Watts and Zimmerman 1990; Adams 2010; Desender et al. 
2013). However, limiting the agency problem by supervising managers comes with a cost, that 
academic literature calls, agency cost. Agency costs thereby comprise the sum of the cost of 
counteracting measures as well as the loss, that is caused by managers deviating behavior, 
which can not be prevented by the aforementioned measures (Jensen and Meckling 1976).  
The dynamics of corporate governance and the associated agency costs are very different in 
LBOs and going private transactions. Kaplan & Strömberg (2009) denote private equity firms 
more active involvement in corporate governance and stricter control of the board as 
“governance engineering”. Former research by Jensen (1989) already criticized the operating 
inefficiency in public corporations, due to the failure of being effectively able to monitor 
management. The engagement of active investors, such as private equity firms, might thereby 
“recapture the lost value (…) using debt and high equity ownership to force effective self 
monitoring” (Jensen 1989, p. 8). Next to the “control function of debt” (Jensen 1986, p.325), 
private equity firms often, replace the top management of the acquired companies and even 
staff seats of the board with their own people. Guo et al. (2011) analyze a sample of 192 LBOs 
between 1990 and 2006 and detect, that the former CEO is replaced in more than one third of 
the analyzed transactions. Besides, they identified that on average more than 50% of the board 
seats are occupied by affiliates of the PE firm (Guo et al. 2011). These changes in the corporate 
governance structure of portfolio companies are therefore likely to lower the agency costs of 
the portfolio company (Kaplan 1989b). Yet, most of previous studies do not engage with 
another form of agency problem, that concerns the choice of capital structure in leveraged 
buyouts. Axelson et al. (2013) suggest, that due to their option like compensation, general 
partners of private equity firms might use leverage ratios that exceed the amount of debt that is 
in the best interest of people that invested in the fund (LPs). The relative importance of both 
effects might be an interesting field for future academic research.  
Edgerton (2012) analyzes the hypothesis that managers are self-interested, and might engage in 




corporate jets, he finds that firms that have previously gone private in a LBO have significantly 
smaller jet fleets, whilst many public firms seem to engage in excessive use of corporate jets. 
Since the analyzed firms where very large, the excessive usage of jets, may have a relatively 
small impact on operating financial performance, but “could represent the tip of a larger iceberg 
of excessive compensation and other agency costs” (Edgerton 2012, p. 2188). Therefore, the 
author proposes that increased monitoring through corporate governance mechanisms in LBOs 
might lead to higher shareholder value through a reduction in agency costs.  
Furthermore, if and how changes in governance in the private equity context, create value seems 
difficult to measure, yet, Guo et al. (2011, p. 503) state, that “governance activities appear 
important in explaining operating gains”. Also Nikoskelainen & Wright (2007) provide 
empirical evidence for a value increasing effect due to changes in corporate governance, in the 
context of leveraged buyouts. Nevertheless, regressing governance variables on operational 
performance measures gives mixed results. While changes in management appear to positively 
contribute towards increased cash flows, contrarily, a higher board involvement of PE firms 
appears to be negatively related to profitability (Guo et al. 2011).  
Finally, a theoretical model, developed by Aguilera & Jackson (2003) is subsequently (in the 
analysis part) used to describe the dynamic changes within the different dimensions of corporate 
governance, that emerged from the acquisition of Burger King by 3G Capital. A condensed 
summary of the main framework is depicted in Appendix 5. 
2.5.2 Incentives  
According to Smith (1990) another possibility that seeks to reduce the agency problem is the 
alignment of management incentives with the interests of shareholders. Thus, both, corporate 
governance mechanisms, and management incentives are ways that can contribute to reduce 
agency costs (Smith 1990). Going one step further, some authors, as Cornelli et al. (2013) even 
classify incentives as a component of corporate governance, due to their statement, that “much 
of the empirical literature on corporate governance and boards studies the provision of 
incentives and pays less attention to monitoring” (Cornelli et al. 2013, p. 432). 
Whereas the previously introduced option like or profit sharing fee of the general partner can 
also be seen as a form of incentivizing, this part is rather concerned with another form of 
incentives, namely, management incentives (Cf. Axelson et al. 2010; Sorensen et al. 2014; 
Jensen 1989). The difference between management incentives in public corporations and 




incentives are built around a strong relationship between pay and performance” (Jensen 1989, 
p.15). Accordingly, Easterwood et al. (1989) also recognize the change that is subject to 
incentive systems after a buyout, which generally lead to a stronger convergence of pay and 
employee performance. They argue that incentive systems are “important to develop 
motivational systems for employees to achieve the key tasks” (Easterwood et al. 1989 p. 41). 
Furthermore, incentives do not only mean that a fraction of the yearly salary is variable and 
linked to performance, but also include the participation in equity financing of management. It 
is thereby common that management contributes a fraction of the upfront equity capital to 
finance the deal. Guo et al. (2011) explored a sample of 94 deals, whereby 58 out of 94 deals 
included equity contributions from management. They propose that the more equity 
management owns, the greater the alignment between shareholders and management, thus, the 
lower the agency costs. Nikoskelainen & Wright (2007) even regard the equity ownership of 
management as one of the main explanations to value enhancement in buyouts. While also 
pronouncing the close link between incentives and governance, the authors claim that equity 
ownership creates “self-monitoring effects”, which in combination with incentives contributes 
to an increase in firm value (Nikoskelainen & Wright 2007, p. 26). In addition, participation in 
the financing of the firm’s equity might not only affect management, but also a broad base of 
the staff in the portfolio firm, through Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOP) (Easterwood 





3 Propositions and expected results 
Traditionally, leverage had played an important role in private equity, whereat, some authors 
even identify leverage, as the main driver for value creation in private equity (Cf. Kaplan 
1989a). Despite the controversy and missing unanimity in academia about the effect and ideal 
level of leverage, this paper acknowledges the marginal tax savings that come along with an 
increased amount of debt (Modigliani & Miller 1958). However, outrageous debt levels, also 
bear an increased risk of default, which creates bankruptcy costs. Deals during the 1980s, were 
commonly levered with a debt ratio of up to 90% (Guo et al. 2011). As the acquisition of Burger 
King was substantially financed by debt, which accounted for approximately 70% of the 
acquisition price, but not overly, compared to deals in the 80’s, there seems to be a potential 
for value creation through substantial interest tax shields. Thus, the following proposition is 
suggested: 
Proposition 1: Value in the Burger King deal is created through higher debt ratios, 
the effect of leverage 
Next, as previously shown, market multiples seem to be correlated with the level of interest 
rates in the market. Taking this for granted, indicates that in times of very low interest rates 
multiples are higher. This could on the one hand be due to pure luck, but as shown also partly 
through skills, as investment timing. Given the long investment horizon of 3G Capital and the 
assumed diligent planning and screening process prior to its acquisitions, the investment firm 
does not have the pressure to close its funds and divest at a specific point in time. Compared to 
other private equity firms, they are not maintaining a closed-end fun, which makes them more 
flexible (Cf. Kaplan & Strömberg 2009). In this case since the global and U.S. economy 
strongly improved between 2010 to 2013, the analyzed horizon, we propose that increased 
valuation multiples also play a role in creating value. Therefore, proposition 2 is formulated: 
Proposition 2: Value is created through variations in market prices, the multiple effect 
According to the literature review, operational improvement, can be seen as the most up to date 
and most frequently discussed topic in recent academic works. Complementary, 3G Capital’s 
history has illustrated their capacity and ability to create value through operational excellence. 
A first initial look at the profit & loss and cash flow statement, shows that both EBITDA as 
well as cash flow have significantly improved during the first years of the holding period. 
Whereas, EBITDA increased with a compounded annual growth rate (CAGR) of around 10%, 




million in 2013, which equals an average annual growth rate of roughly 37%. It appears as these 
two measures are in alignment with the initial assumption that the Burger King deal created 
value by operational improvements, which is the rationale for stating proposition 3:  
Proposition 3: Value is created through improved operations, the operational 
improvement effect, which can be split into  
3.1  Value creation through EBITDA improvements 
3.1.1   Increased revenue 
3.1.2   Improved margin 
3.2  Value creation through cash flow improvements  
It is expected that operational improvement is the most important source or driver of value 
creation in the Burger King deal. This hypothesis is on the one hand adapted from research, 
conducted by Achleitner et al. (2010), on the other hand preliminary confirmed by initial 
qualitative research about 3G Capital’s value creation approach. By comparing the results of 
the analysis with a benchmark of other PE deals, it is expected that the deal created more value 
through operational improvement, than the average PE deals of the same dimension. 
Whilst, the former propositions are rather concerned with explaining the dimensions and direct 
drivers of value creation, lastly factors are analyzed that may positively contribute towards 
value creation, and contribute to explain how value is created, foremost on the operational level. 
Since public firms also make use of leverage, improve their operations and occasionally engage 
in mergers & acquisitions, where they might be exposed to the multiple effect, we want to 
analyze what really differentiates value creation in private equity from the creation of value in 
public firms. As shown in the literature review, corporate governance and incentives are two 
management tools, which are described as indirect drivers of value creation. Besides, their 
underlying mechanisms often change in the context of buyouts. The case of 3G Capital’s 
acquisition of Burger King suggests that both the dynamics of governance and incentives 
changed due to the context of the acquisition, since Burger King incentivizes not only senior 
management, but also less senior people, i.e. the analyst level. Moreover, the corporate 
governance environment changed on a great deal, as for instance top management and the board 
of Burger King was replaced by affiliates of the 3G Capital network. Corporate governance is 
often strongly in line with incentives, and not strictly separable. Both together might be 
powerful to contribute to value creation, where governance might give direction and incentives 





Proposition 4: Indirect drivers play a role in explaining value creation in leveraged 
buyouts, especially on the level of operational improvements: 
4.1 Corporate governance is an indirect driver of value 
4.2 Incentive alignment is an indirect driver of value: 
Finally, it is expected that corporate governance and incentives are a key differentiation criteria 
compared to other funds, which might be related to the fact that 3G Capital does not have the 
pressure to divest at a certain point in time, in contrast to many closed-end funds. It is thereby 
anticipated that it will not be possible to correctly quantify all drivers of value. All the more it 
is expected that 3G creates value through a consolidation of many different factors, which are 






4.1 Presentation and Description of the Method to be used  
This thesis uses quantitative and qualitative analyses. Thereby it is important to mention that 
there is no stringent approach, which has been used throughout this thesis. Two research papers, 
namely Achleitner et al. (2010) and Acharya et al. (2012) were especially important during the 
course of the quantitative part that seeks to present an answer to the question of what are the 
main drivers of value in the Burger King buyout. It has to be clarified that this thesis seeks to 
apply and consequently interpret the results, using the previously introduced theories, instead 
of validating them. Amongst others, the previously introduced framework of Berg & Gottschalg 
(2005) is used to qualitatively supplement and explain the quantitative findings, whereas the 
focus will be set on the drivers, which are analyzed through the Achleitner et al. (2010) model. 
In addition, a corporate governance framework of Aguilera & Jackson (2003) is used to 
understand the dynamics of corporate governance.  
As a basis for applying the model, provided by Achleitner & Capital Dynamics (2009) and 
Achleitner et al. (2010), we first of all need to identify the firm value, respectively the value of 
Burger King’s equity at the determined exit date. Therefore, several established methods are 
used, as (i) market multiples, (ii) the discounted cash flow approach and (iii) market 
capitalization. Based on the results of the previous valuation results, we can calculate the 
internal rate of return (IRR), a method that is commonly used especially in private equity 
investments. When calculating the internal rate of return of a project, not only the initial upfront 
investment has to be regarded, but also all the cash flows during the life time of the project 
(Damodaran 2012).  
Achleitner et al. (2010) argue that previous approaches that seek to measure value creation in 
LBOs do not separate operational and financial risk. Therefore, they provide an alternative 
method, which is in line with the approach of Achary et al. (2012). Both approaches have in 
common that they differentiate returns, which are attributable to leverage from returns that have 
been achieved on an unlevered basis. Hence, Achleitner et al. (2010) go a step further by 
offering a framework that allows to differentiate the unlevered returns by different levers of 
value creation. Applying this framework subsequently facilitates the interpretation and 
comparison of the results. This is why Achleitner et al. (2010) is chosen as the main framework 
in the quantitative part of this thesis. Appendix 6 summarizes the respective summary of results 




the created value stems from leverage, whereas the other two thirds come from the operational 
and multiple effect (Achleitner et al. 2010). These drivers are also covered in the previous 
structure of the literature review, as depicted in Appendix 7. 
The explained returns by Achleitner et al. (2010) attributable to operational improvement or 
from the risk perspective operational risk, are composed of (i) increased EBITDA margin47, 
streamlining working capital and CAPEX48, and the multiple effect. Lastly a combination factor 
is added that represents combined changes in EBITDA growth and EBITDA Multiples 
(Achleitner et al. 2010). In the previously proposed value creation structure, EBITDA margin 
and free cash flow improvement are situated on the second level of value generation, as 
respective measures or drivers of operational performance improvement that is situated on the 
first level. The multiple effect and the leverage effect are both levers at the first level. Appendix 
6 summarizes and highlights the dimensions and measures that are explicitly derived through 
the application of the model, developed by Achleitner et al. (2010) and Capital Dynamics49.  
In order to derive the effect of leverage, we can apply the formula provided by, Achary et al. 
(2012), who in their paper examine excess returns generated by private equity firms. All the 
more, they differentiate between excess returns that are attributable to financial leverage in 
comparison to other levers. In order to derive the excess returns, which are associated to the 
generated interest tax shields, it is proceeded as follows. First, the Internal Rate of Return (IRR) 
of a certain deal is calculated, also characterized as the levered return (RL). Second, the 
unlevered return (RU) is derived, by un-levering the IRR (RL) with the following slightly 
simplified formula50: 
  𝑅= = 	  




   
whereas: 𝑡 = 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒	  𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒	  𝑡𝑎𝑥	  ; H
I
= 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒	  𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒	  𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜  
Following, we subtract the unlevered return from the levered return and therefore derive the 
difference in the IRR between the levered and unlevered firm. By dividing the difference in 
IRR by the levered return (RL), the fraction of IRR that is attributable to the leverage effect is 
                                                
47 Some authors further split this into the effect of increased sales and operating cost reduction, e.g. Muscarella & 
Vetsuypens (1990). 
48 Achleitner et al. (2010) call this free cash flow effect. 
49 First published in an article, written by Prof. Dr. Dr. Ann-Kristin Achleitner (TU Munich) and Dr. Katharina 
Lichtner and Dr. Christian Diller (both Capital Dynamics). 




derived51. Going forward, we want to explain the increase in equity through the remaining other 
effects, thus, all but the leverage effect. 
The multiple effect is operationalized by subtracting the entry multiple multiplied by the entry 
EBITDA (MultipleEntry * EBITDAEntry) from the respective exit multiple that was previously 
also multiplied with the entry EBITDA (MultipleExit * EBITDAEntry) (Achleitner et al. 2010). In 
addition, the model provided by Achleitner & Capital Dynamics (2009), measures value added 
by changes in EBITDA as follows. To begin with, EBITDA at the entry point is subtracted 
from the EBITDA value at the end of the holding period. Following, the resulting difference is 
multiplied by the entry EBITDA multiple. The outcome of this is the absolute value, attributable 
to improvements in EBITDA. The free cash flow lever, is derived by summing up the free cash 
flows that a firm generates in the prospective holding period. These cash flows can for example 
be distributed to shareholders through dividend payments or share buybacks, or can also used 
to repay debt and therefore in turn possibly decreasing the cost of debt. As Burger King’s total 
debt did not decrease during the holding period, but rather slightly increased, we assume the 
cost of debt to be constant. As usually both multiples and EBITDA change over the holding 
period, there has to be a correction factor that accounts for this effect. The correction factor is 
calculated by multiplying the change in EBITDA with the change in the multiple, as follows: 
(MultipleExit - MultipleEntry) * (EBITDAExit - EBITDAEntry). In some cases, the correction factor 
is negative, as for instance EBITDA increased, while simultaneously the multiple decreased 
over the holding period52. 
Furthermore, the time frame of the analysis has to be defined. Since the acquisition took place 
on October 19, 201053, which lies in the middle of the fourth quarter, the analysis in the 
quantitative part will for simplicity purposes only include cash flows starting from January 1, 
201154. When calculating the IRR for Burger King’s shareholders, we assume that the initial 
investment took place on December 31, 2010. On the other side, the time frame for the holding 
period is closed with the assumed exit date on December 31st 2013, including all the cash flows 
that accrued in the fiscal year 2013. The closing date, is on the one hand determined by the 
availability of data, but foremost by the combination of Tim Hortons and Burger King as 
Restaurant Brands International in August 26, 201455. This acquisition changes many of the 
                                                
51 Wertsteigerungshebel in Private Equity-Transaktionen (Zürich, November 2009). 
52 Wertsteigerungshebel in Private Equity-Transaktionen (Zürich, November 2009). 
53 Burger King Worldwide (2013): Annual report 2013. 
54 Including the cash flows of the fourth quarter would also only marginally impact the results. 




previous circumstances and brings new sources for operational improvement through the 
potential realization of synergies, but also further tax improvements that might be feasible 
through tax inversions56. Thus, the chosen time frame for the financial analysis ranges from the 
fiscal year 2011, starting on January 1st, 2011 to the fiscal year 2013, ending on December 31st 
2013 under Burger King Worldwide. However, for comparison purposes we will also look at 
prior annual reports that lie before the acquisition of Burger King by 3G Capital in October 
2010, in order to better forecast financial data.  
In parallel to the quantitative analysis of value drivers, the case is systematically analyzed on a 
qualitative basis and contemporaneously related to prevalent academic literature. The chosen 
structure is thereby top-down, starting from the examination of value creation and the 
composition into it’s main drivers in Chapter 5: Quantitative analysis of direct drivers. After 
the disaggregation of the main value drivers into 5.2.1 The effect of leverage, 5.2.2 The multiple 
effect and 5.2.3 The effect of operational improvements, the obtained results are critically 
discussed in 4.2.4. Lastly, indirect drivers of operational improvement are analyzed in Chapter 
6, which might also partially affect the aforementioned direct drivers. The qualitative analysis 
of these indirect drivers is mainly based on publicly available information as well as the result 
of one qualitative interview with Tim Brueggemann, a divisional Vice President at Burger King. 
Since Mr. Brueggemann is based in Miami, Florida, the semi-structured interview was 
conducted via telephone. The interview guideline and the respective results can be found in 
Appendix 17.  
4.2 Basic Assumptions Adopted and limitations of the method 
This paper adopts some of the main assumptions from Achleitner et al. (2010). First of all, it is 
assumed that debt availability is restricted, which is likely to be increasingly relevant in the 
future. Besides, by unlevering the IRR, and thereby separating operational from financial risk, 
it is assumed that the returns to equity are better comparable across different transactions (Cf. 
Achleitner et al. 2010). Finally, equity returns are calculated gross of fees, paid to the private 
equity firm, which means that the equity returns to the final investors are lower as they are still 
subject to the fees that are charged by the private equity firm. The paper focuses on value 
creation and the individual drivers, without regarding on how value is distributed among the 
different groups of investors. This is why we did not include the $1,4 billion proceeds to 3G 
Capital, after the reverse merger in 2012, as this is regarded as a wealth transfer between 
                                                




different investors of Burger King, instead of creating value. Alternatively, when only including 
the returns to 3G Capital one could add the $1,4 billion in the calculation of the IRR, but from 
this point weighing future cash flows (for instance dividends and the overall equity at the exit 
date) with 71%. Thereby, one can calculate the returns that are exclusively attributable to 3G 
Capital.  
In this research there are several sources for limitations. The main limitation is that this thesis 
views value creation, by focusing on the perspective of the investors. Beyond that value creation 
could also view other perspectives and for example consider the consequences and potential 
value losses through downsizing of jobs. As the literature review is mainly based on traditional 
private equity funds, which are usually closed-end, it is important to state that the firm 3G 
Capital differs in some of these aspects, for instance due to the long-term investment horizon.  
Furthermore, it is important to state that this is not a valuation thesis. The main focus lies on 
identifying the composition of value creation and the related qualitative interpretations. 
Additionally, there are some constraints in data collection, between the point of the acquisition, 
where Burger King went private and the renewed relisting of parts of Burger King shares at the 
New York Stock Exchange on June 20, 201257. This is why the ratio of debt to equity is not 
available throughout the whole period. Since the debt levels were only slightly varying during 
the holding period, the D/E ratio at the exit point was applied to calculate the effect of leverage. 
The model introduced by Achleitner et al. (2010) suggested to apply an average rate. Moreover, 
not including parts of the last quarter in 2010, might pose further restrictions on the derived 
results, which are however not expected to adversely change the final results of this paper.   
Finally, this thesis used a holistic case study approach and not an empirical analysis that can be 
generalized and applied to other firms and scenarios. The analysis is also purely based on the 
Burger King deal, therefore analyses the deal on the transaction instead of the the fund level. 
Accordingly, many of the results are not necessarily transferable and may not be easily imitable 
in other deals. 
  
                                                
57 Restaurant Brands International (2014) press release: World’s third largest quick service restaurant company 




5 Quantitative analysis of direct drivers 
This part of the thesis is depicting the value that was created at Burger King in the given time 
period. In a first step the value of the enterprise, respectively the value of the equity at the 
divestment stage is calculated. Based on this value and the entry value the resulting IRR is 
derived. Thereafter the achieved IRR is split into several components, the direct value drivers, 
which are at the same time qualitatively interpreted.  
5.1 Valuation and calculation of IRR 
In the following several approaches are used to estimate the value of Burger King. The most 
appropriate method is used to derive the respective IRR for the investors of Burger King.  
5.1.1 Market multiples approach 
The multiple valuation is based on a selected peer group of mostly American fast-food 
restaurant chains, as for instance the McDonald’s Corporation or Sonic Corporation as well as 
fast food holdings as for example Yum! Brands58. The average Enterprise Value/EBITDA 
multiple (EV/EBITDA) of the peer group to date equals 13,16 59 , which is illustrated in 
Appendix 8. As some of these competitors have a strong focus only on the American market 
the peer group might not completely accurately represent an appropriate multiple for Burger 
King, yet as Burger King’s self-appointed biggest global competitor McDonald’s Corp., is 
evaluated on a 13,53 EV/EBITDA multiple, the value of 13,16 seems to be representative. 
Multiplying the aforementioned multiple with Burger King’s EBITDA of $588 million in 2013, 
yields an enterprise value of $7.737,84 million.  
5.1.2 Discounted Cash-flow approach (DCF) 
In order to evaluate Burger King based on its discounted future cash flows, the P&L and other 
financial measures such as changes in NWC are forecasted. These forecasts have to be carefully 
considered, as they rely on many different assumptions. First of all, total future revenue 
development was estimated by analyzing franchise and property revenues and company 
restaurants revenues separately. Whereas the number of company restaurants is assumed to 
stay constant going forward, the number of franchises is expected to grow by 3,5% annually60. 
                                                
58 Yum! Brands, Inc. is a global firm that manages licensed brands as Pizza Hut, Taco Bell and Kentucky Fried 
Chicken (KFC), http://www.yum.com/. 
59 It is acknowledged that a more accurate result would have been achieved by taking the respective multiple at 
the artificial exit date of Burger King on (31.12.13). 
60 In 2014 the increase in new franchises was 5,2%, the estimated 3,5% is slightly lower than the value of 2014 




In addition to the increase in the number of franchises, a volume increase in franchise revenues 
of 0,5% was applied for each individual franchise restaurant as well as the proprietary company 
restaurants61. Appendix 9 summarizes the sales forecasts for 2014 until 2018 and depicts all 
individual forecasts that were contributing to the overall calculation. Based on the previous 
years and the interview results with Tim Brueggemann, Vice President at Burger King, 
operating expenses are further reduced by annually 5%. However, in order to get more cautious 
and slightly more conservative results, this was only applied for the years 2014 and 2015, 
whereas expenses are assumed to stay constant between 2016 and 2018. Applying the 
previously mentioned assumptions with the forecasts for depreciation62, interests63 and taxes64, 
results in a net income of $316,4 million in 2014. The complete forecasts of Burger King’s 
P&L are depicted in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1: Profit & Loss statement of Burger King Worldwide based on own calculations 
The cost of debt is always a very critical factor in LBOs. In general, a high proportion of 
generated cash flows is used to pay back debt, which suggests that another valuation could be 
more appropriate, as for instance the Adjusted Present Value method (APV). The APV method 
first discounts the unlevered cash flows with the unlevered cost of capital and second discounts 
the interest tax shield of each year respectively with a different cost of debt, whereas the 
discount rate is usually lower in the last years of the explicit period. Yet, when looking at the 
                                                
61 This is attributable to the “comparable sales increase“ in existing restaurants, mainly attributable to improved 
marketing efforts and optimized menu offering.  
62 The rationales for the other forecasts are as follows, starting with Depreciation: (Damodaran 2012) suggests to 
calculate depreciation based on the percentage of depreciation to sales in the previous year, hence the year 2013 
and for example not the average of five years since depreciations are less affected by fluctuations.  
63 With the debt level at the end of 2013, a cost of debt of 6,11% was calculated (weighted average of the current 
outstanding debt in 2013 yields an average interest rate of 6,11%), This is also in line with the high yield bond that 
has been issued in 2014 (Terms on the B-/Caa1 transaction were finalized at 6%) 
(http://www.highyieldbond.com/burger-king-2-25b-7-5-year-high-yield-bonds-b-caa1-price-to-yield-6/). 
64 The assumed tax rate is 25%, which is fairly in line with the tax rate in 2012 and 2013. Because of internationally 
dispersed operations the tax rate is slightly below the US-tax rate. 
P&L$%$Burger$King$Worldwide$(in$$$million)
2013A 2014F 2015F 2016F 2017F 2018F
Revenue 1.146,3 1.200,1 1.240,4 1.282,4 1.325,9 1.371,2
Franchise*and*property*revenues 923,6 976,3 1.015,5 1.056,3 1.098,7 1.142,9
YoY 15% 5,70% 4,02% 4,02% 4,02% 4,02%
Company*restaurant*revenues 222,7 223,8 224,9 226,1 227,2 228,3
YoY A0,8 0,50% 0,50% 0,50% 0,50% 0,50%
A Operating*expenses 558 530,4 503,9 503,9 503,9 503,9
= Income$from$operations($EBITDA) 588,0 669,7 736,6 778,5 822,1 867,3
Operating,margin 51,3% 55,8% 59,4% 60,7% 62,0% 63,3%
A Depreciation 65,8 68,9 71,3 73,6 76,1 78,7
EBIT 522,2 600,8 665,3 704,9 745,9 788,6
A Interest*expenses,*net 200 179 179 179 179 179
A Loss*on*early*extinguishment*of*debt 0 0 0 0 0 0
= Income$before$income$taxes$(EBT) 322,2 421,9 486,4 525,9 567,0 609,7
A Taxes 89 105 122 131 142 152
Tax,Rate,on,EBT 27% 25% 25% 25% 25% 25%





last financial years at Burger King (2010 until 2013), illustrated in Appendix 11, one can see 
that there were no major extraordinary debt repayments and that the debt level is relatively 
stable (in absolute terms). This is why in this case, APV was considered as a possible valuation 
method but in the end given the mentioned rationales not chosen as a valuation method. 
Moreover, in order to run the DCF valuation, CAPEX and changes in NWC65 were forecasted. 
As a benchmark for future investments, the ratio of CAPEX/Sales in 2013, which equals 2,22% 
is applied to the future year66. Finally, a weighted cost of capital of 6,29% was used to discount 
the respective free cash flows, yielding an enterprise value of $12.647 million. It is important 
to note that a high proportion, approximately 81%, of the EV is constituted of the terminal 
value. The calculation of the WACC is depicted in the aforementioned Appendix 10, whereas 
the DCF valuation is shown in Figure 2.  
 
Figure 2: DCF valuation methhod results of Burger King, based on own calculations.  
5.1.3 Market capitalization approach 
A first indication for positive returns is visible when comparing Burger King’s enterprise value, 
based on market capitalization and total debt. It is thereby apparent that Burger King’s 
enterprise value significantly increased from the end of 2010, a few months after the 
acquisition, to December 31st 2013. According to this data, the enterprise value increased by 
more than 3,5 times to around $10,3 billion. This enterprise value is composed of the market 
capitalization of $8.050 million in addition to the total debt of $3.037 million, subtracted by 
cash & equivalents in the amount of $787 million. The development of market capitalization 
and total debt between 2009 and 2013 is depicted in Appendix 1167.  
                                                
65 As no reliable data about working capital levels are available, the increase in working capital as a percentage 
of increase in revenue is used (from the year 2013). This is fairly in line with Damodaran (2012) who suggests to 
look at the peer group average for increase in working capital as a percentage of increase in revenue. 
66 CAPEX were significantly reduced mainly due to the “global refranchising initiative” (Burger King Annual 
Report 2013).  
67 Note that there is no available public information for market capitalization at the end of 2010 and 2011, as the 
company was taken private by 3G Capital. 
DCF$%$valuation$(in$$$million)$
2013A 2014F 2015F 2016F 2017F 2018F TV
EBIT 522,2 601 665 705 746 789
! Tax%on%EBIT%(T%x%EBIT) 131 150 166 176 186 197
= NOPLAT 392 451 499 529 559 591
+ Depreciation 66 69 71 74 76 79
! d%Investment%in%Working%Capital !93 6 5 5 5 5
! Capital%Expenditures 26 27 28 29 29 31
= Free$Cash$Flow$From$Operations 525 487 538 569 601 635
+ Cash%Flow%from%Investing%activities% 43 0 0 0 0 0
= Free$Cash$Flow$To$The$Firm 482 487 538 569 601 635 13.973







The enterprise value of around $10.305 million, which was calculated using market 
capitalization and net debt was ultimately used to calculate internal rate of return. Compared to 
the other two methods, it seems to be the most appropriate approach as it is specific to Burger 
King and not dependent on a variety of assumptions. The multiple valuation method for instance 
is based on competitor’s valuations and includes many other factors that are neither specific to 
Burger King, nor to a buyout context. In turn, the DCF valuation depends on many different 
assumptions that highly vary according to the analysts partly subjective assessment. 
Additionally, the DCF method values the equity based on future cash flows, which may 
overstate the value creation until a specific date. The DCF might therefore be more relevant in 
an attempt to calculate and decompose the IRR before the completion of a deal for instance in 
order to forecast value creation in the acquisition stage of a deal.  
5.1.4 Calculation of the IRR 
In order to calculate the IRR, equity value at the point of exit is needed, which is previously 
defined to be December 31st 2013. Besides, the derived the free cash flows that were available 
during the holding period and distributed through dividends and debt repayments, are included. 
It is important, to also include these cash flows to the equity holders, since according to 
Damodaran (2012), we cannot only use the entry and exit equity value to derive the correct 
IRR. Besides, the IRR is calculated on a cross-basis without accounting for fees that were 
charged by the management of 3G Capital.  
The IRR is then calculated on the basis of three components. Firstly, the initial equity 
investment of $1.200 million on December 31st, 2010. Secondly, cash flows accrued to equity 
holders through dividend payments of around $393, $14 and $84 million respectively at the end 
of 2011, 2012 and 2013. Thirdly, the previously derived equity value of $8.050,42 million, at 
the point of exit on December 31st, 2013. Finally, based on these cash flows, an Internal Rate 
of Return (IRR) of 113,18% is calculated68.  
5.2 Analysis and composition of direct drivers  
As formerly mentioned, one big advantage of the model provided by Achleitner et al. (2010) is 
the intuitive application. Thereafter, we can assess value creation in the acquisition of Burger 
King, by breaking down the Internal Rate of Return of 101,91%, into different levers.  
                                                
68 Note that if we wrongly had ignored the cash flows that were distributed to investors during the holding 




5.2.1 The effect of leverage 
In order to derive the value that can be attributable to leverage, the value of the unlevered firm 
was calculated. This was done with the unlevered IRR of 70,23%, which was derived, using 
the previously introduced formula in the methodology part69. Applying the IRR of 70,23% as 
yearly growth on the initial investment of $1.200 million, during the respective holding period, 
results in an equity value of the unlevered firm of $5.919,58 million. Subtracting the previously 
derived value from the exit equity value of the levered firm ($8.050,42 million) delivers the 
effect that is attributable to leverage, which is equal to $2.130,84 million in value increase. 
Most likely, value through leverage is to a large part attributable to the PE firm and therefore 
extrinsic to Burger King. It is unlikely that Burger King would have issued a similar proportion 
of debt without the influence and control of a financial sponsor. Moreover, it is possible that 
Burger King, through the help of 3G Capital, was able to reduce the capital cost of debt, since 
3G Capital is most likely a “repeat player” on debt markets (Berg & Gottschalg 2005). The 
effect of leverage is visible through tax savings during the holding period and depends on the 
relation of debt to equity that is maintained during this period70. Yet, it is also largely dependent 
on the initial financing structure, which is set during the acquisition phase.  
5.2.2 The multiple effect 
Going forward, the marginal creation of value will be examined that is attributable to all other 
drivers except leverage. It is important to note that the value explained by the following drivers, 
is in total slightly higher than the value of the unlevered firm of $5.919,58 million, as we also 
have to add up the dividends that have been paid out before the exit date. Adding the sum of 
dividends, which have been paid out during the holding period ($491,7 million), yields an 
overall value of gross cash flow through non financial levers of $6.411,28 million.  
As the exit multiple is not known, it had to be calculated by dividing the enterprise value at the 
exit date (m$8.169,68), which is comprised of the sum of the unlevered equity value at exit 
(m$5.919,58) and net debt (m$2.250,1), with the EBITDA at the point of exit. The difference 
of the resulting exit EV/EBITDA multiple (13,89) and the entry EV/EBITDA multiple (8,53) 
                                                
69 Note that we calculated the unlevered IRR using the debt/equity ratio at the divestment point instead of an 
average during the holding period. This is done since market capitalization is not applicable for the years 2010 and 
2011. Moreover, note that we calculated the unlevered IRR from the basis of the levered IRR that does only include 
the entry and exit equity values. Since we are interested in calculating the value of the unlevered firm, with help 
of the IRR, we are not including past cash flows that were already distributed to investors.  
70 Private equity firms usually do not keep the capital structure of portfolio firms constant. The capital structure 




is then multiplied with the EBITDA value at the point of entry (m$444,6). The calculation 
yields $2.384,28 million, the marginal increase of value through the multiple effect. 
Since the Burger King deal has in reality not yet reached the divestment stage, the used 
EV/EBITDA multiple was calculated based on the unlevered equity value. When using the 
market capitalization approach, to determine the firm value of Burger King, the increased 
multiple might therefore in parts be explainable through investors expectations on future 
performance, i.e. higher future cash flows. This can be extrinsic to the controlling stake of 3G 
Capital, whereas investors have positive expectations in the future prospects of Burger King as 
a portfolio company of 3G Capital. In accordance with Berg & Gottschalg (2005), the multiple 
is likely to be positively affected by improved operating performance71. Increasing Burger 
King’s EBITDA from $444,6 million in 2010 to $558,0 million in 2013, might have therefore 
had a positive effect on increasing the multiple, next to other reasons, as for instance 
improvement in public market valuations in the fast food industry. Other explaining factors 
from the Berg & Gottschalg (2005) framework that influence the multiple effect, as private 
information, are likely to play a minor role, since they are more relevant in MBOs.  
Superior market information and deal-making capabilities could also have played a role, as 3G 
Capital possesses a strong network around the world72 and usually directly approaches its 
targets, thereby surpassing structured bidding processes that involves more competition due to 
multiple bidders, which usually drives up the price that the acquirer pays (Barney 1988). 
Thereby they potentially pay a smaller multiple at entry or detect an undervaluation, thus 
creating value already during the acquisition phase. Finally, the optimization of corporate scope 
most likely played a role in increasing the multiple that would have been reached through a 
divestment at the end of December 2013. By selling off assets, which are potentially 
undervalued, as for instance, Burger King’s action of selling 1.292 company-owned restaurants 
between 2010 and 2013, might not only have freed cash flows, but also increased the average 
value of assets (Berg & Gottschalg 2005).  
All of the aforementioned causes for the multiple effect are extrinsic to the private equity firm 
(Cf. Berg & Gottschalg). Most of these causes are likely to have appeared during the acquisition 
and divestment phase, whereas the optimization of corporate scope appeared during the holding 
period. Moreover, it is suggested that the multiple effect in the Burger King example is closely 
                                                
71 Compare this also to Achleitner et al. (2011), who found that higher sales are positively contributing to higher 
exit multiples. 




related to the operational improvement that has been taken place during the holding period as 
well as the future expected improvements in EBITDA and cash flows that are anticipated.  
5.2.3 The effect of operational improvement 
The two main drivers of operational improvement are the effect of EBITDA enhancement and 
the cash flow effect. First, the result of the EBITDA improvement effect is $1.223,38 million, 
which solely reflects the changes in EBITDA within the three years of the holding period. 
Within this time, the EBITDA increased by 32,25% from m$444,6 at the end of 2010 to m$588 
in December 201373. The EBITDA effect can further be broken down into the effect of sales 
improvement, margin improvement and a correction factor. Appendix 12 summarizes the 
results comprehensively. Given the change in the Burger King business model that included 
selling most of the proprietary restaurants, sales were constantly decreasing within the 
considered time frame. Hence, the growth in EBITDA was only generated through margin 
expansion, with at the same time a significant decline on the top-line. Therefore, the overall 
development in sales theoretically contributed negatively towards the overall EBITDA effect. 
Thus, the correction factor of around $3.878 million accounts for simultaneous changes in both 
drivers (negative sales growth and improved EBITDA margin). Breaking down the sales 
development in franchise and property revenues and company restaurant revenues helps to 
understand the dynamics behind the decrease in sales and to make implications about future 
developments. Contrariwise to the declining revenues through company restaurants, franchise 
and property revenues were constantly growing, on average at 11,8% during the holding period. 
As by the end of 2013 all restaurants were sold74, going forward the EBITDA effect is expected 
to be considerably stronger, as top-line growth is added next to the further likely margin 
improvements. It cannot be ruled out that parts of these future improvements are already 
factored into the multiple effect, as previously discussed.  
Additionally, the cash flow effect, leads to an absolute value increase of $834,6 million. This 
effect is composed of the dividend payouts during the holding period (m$491,7) and the 
reduction in net debt of $342,9 million between the entry and the exit point. The reduction in 
net debt is often also known as de-leverage effect. The cash flow effect measures the cash flows 
that were generated throughout the holding period (Capital Dynamics & Achleitner 2009). In 
this case cash both debt repayments and dividend payments were considered for the cash flow 
effect. Lastly, as suggested in the Achleitner et al. (2010) framework, a combination effect of 
                                                
73 The effect is calculated by multiplying the difference of m$588 and m$444,6 by the entry multiple (8,53). 




$769,02 million is added, which measures simultaneous changes in EBITDA and multiple 
during the holding period. 
Comparing the different levers of the operational improvement effect, with the framework 
provided by Berg & Gottschalg (2005) it appears as on the one extreme the margin 
improvements are rather related to increasing operational effectiveness, whereas on the other 
extreme the decline in sales is related to increasing strategic distinctiveness in Berg & 
Gottschalg (2005). The cash flow effect, is also strongly related to the reducing capital 
requirements lever, which is a sub-lever of increasing operational effectiveness, in the given 
Berg & Gottschalg (2005) framework. However, given the strong influence of EBITDA 
towards free cash flow it remains questionable if the Achleitner et al. (2005) model accounts 
for this lever correctly. Therefore this paper suggests an alternative method to derive the impact 
of the cash flow effect. Two approaches might be feasible to only regard the capital 
requirements elements and ignoring operating profits, in the cash flow effect. As depicted in 
Appendix 13, two methods are suggested, one forward looking and one backwards looking 
method. The first method that accounts for the past perspective adds up the sum of free cash 
flows that are attributable to depreciation, NWC and CAPEX. It functions similar as the method 
proposed by Capital Dynamics & Achleitner (2009), but the hereby proposed method ignores 
the effect of operating profits, which result in a much smaller cash flow effect75. Using this 
method, the absolute impact of the cash flow effect would be only $256 million. The second 
proposed method, forecasts depreciation, NWC and CAPEX and calculates the enterprise value, 
only based on these three elements. Discounting with the appropriate cost of capital leads to an 
enterprise value of approximately $198 million, which is attributable to the impact of the cash 
flow effect or changes in capital requirements.  
5.2.4 Relative importance of value drivers 
Consequently, it is useful to look at the absolute effect of value creation and the relative effects 
of the different value drivers. Achleitner et al. (2010) present their results with the help of the 
money multiplier76, which is defined as the “ratio of all positive and negative cash proceeds” 
                                                
75 Note that the previous calculation included all dividend payments and the final reduction in net debt. In theory, 
this should equal the free cash flow available to the firm, during the holding period. However, since not all free 
cash flows to the equity are directly distributed to the shareholders, and for instance in 2011 the dividend payment 
was higher than the generated free cash flows to the equity, the sum of the free cash flows is different from the 
sum of payments to shareholders and principal payments and debt push downs to creditors. For the former 
calculation of the free cash flow effect, this paper used the sum of dividends and reduction in net debt, as suggested 
in Capital Dynamics & Achleitner et al. (2009). 




(Achleitner et al. 2014, p. 430). Applying the money multiplier to each of the individual drivers, 
shows the contribution of value as depicted in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3: Money multiple contribution of each value driver, including entry equity value 
Moreover, since we are interested in the overall value increase, or the net cash flow, without 
the initial investment, overall times money, is calculated by subtracting 1 from the money 
multiple (Achleitner et al. 2010). The money multiple77 is the ratio of positive cash flows to the 
initial investment 78 . The overall times money multiple of 6,12 can furthermore be fully 
explained by the individual measures. Dividing each individual money multiplier by the overall 
times money, uncovers the relative effect of each individual driver. Figure 4 illustrates the 
relative percentage contribution of each driver. 
 
Figure 4 Composition of IRR: Different percentage contribution of value drivers 
Finally, the previous approach was applied to Burger King’s biggest competitor, the 
McDonald’s Corporation. The publicly available market capitalization was used for the 
respective holding period of Burger King. The respective IRR for McDonald’s shareholders 
                                                
77 Multiplying the initial investment by the money multiple yields the overall cash proceeds. 
78 Note that cash proceeds include the exit value as well as formerly distributed cash flows. If further investments 
are made during the holding period a better definition of the money multiple might be “the ratio of all positive to 











































































equals 5,92%, without dividend payments79. The most striking result of the analyzed data is not 
only the substantially smaller IRR, but also the composition of individual drivers that constitute 
the returns. Appendix 14 presents and compares the breakdown of value drivers for 
McDonald’s and Burger King according to the money multiple. These results suggest that the 
EBITDA effect was the only relevant effect for the public peer, which was on a relative basis 
still lower than Burger King’s improvement in EBITDA80.  
  
                                                
79 Whereas the same tax rate and cost of debt was assumed. McDonald’s cost of debt is expected to be less, 
amongst others due to the lower leverage ratio. 
80 Burger King’s EBITDA increased by approximately 32% between 2010 and 2013 whereas McDonald’s only 




6 Qualitative Analysis of indirect drivers  
The formerly analyzed drivers have shown that the Burger King buyout has created a 
remarkable amount of value. However, it remains questionable why Burger King was only able 
to take advantage of these drivers in the context of the acquisition of 3G Capital. Would they 
also have been able to pull the aforementioned drivers on a stand-alone basis? As many of the 
elements of the value drivers are extrinsic to Burger King, it seems as this question can be 
answered with: rather not, at least not in the amount that has been shown81. In the following we 
will analyze the indirect or secondary drivers that will partly explain why value generation is 
different in the context of leveraged buyouts Berg & Gottschalg (2005). 
6.1 Corporate governance 
In line with incentives, corporate governance is one of the most frequently mentioned indirect 
drivers in academia. Both indirect drivers are frequently associated to the agency problem and 
are possible solutions to reduce agency costs (Berg & Gottschalg 2005). The Aguilera & 
Jackson (2003) corporate governance framework is in this case especially suitable as it views 
corporate governance from the perspective of the three most important stakeholder groups in 
the Burger King buyout, namely capital providers (shareholders as well as creditors), 
management and employees. By using the Aguilera & Jackson (2003) framework, which is 
depicted in Appendix 5, it is dispensable to analyze other secondary value drivers as (iii) 
leverage as a form of controlling managerial behavior and (iv) culture and form of 
communication separately, since they are already indirectly included in the corporate 
governance framework.  
The capital perspective of corporate governance, views the capital structure, interests of capital 
and the maturity of capital. The capital structure in the Burger King deal changed significantly 
during the holding period. Whilst 3G Capital’s initial investment was financed by 
approximately 70% debt, the total debt ratio was strongly decreasing to around 29% at the 
divestment stage82. Creditors, who are assumed to be risk averse, generally receive a steady 
income through interest rates, but do not have control rights in the firm. Control rights for 
creditors usually only come into play when the company is not able to pay its debt or expulses 
against certain covenants (Aguilera & Jackson (2003). As Burger King seemingly did not 
violate any of these terms, the control right remained at the side of the equity investors, which 
                                                
81 Whereas it is acknowledged that a certain fraction of value generation would and could have appeared without 
being acquired by 3G Capital. 




are mainly represented by 3G Capital. The increased debt ratios, especially during the beginning 
of the holding period, might have in line with (Jensen 1986) further reduced the flexibility of 
management, due to the pressure of serving payments to debt-holders. This in turn is likely to 
have an efficiency increasing effect on the operational results of Burger King83. Looking at the 
concentration of equity ownership (La Porta et al. 1999) of Burger King it gets apparent that 
ownership is very concentrated84. Whereas 3G Capital owned around 70% of the stock’s at the 
end of 2013, a large proportion of the remaining fraction belongs to people that are associated 
with 3G Capital85, as for instance the hedge fund Pershing Square Capital Management founded 
by Bill Ackman, which owns around 10% of the outstanding equity86. In the annual report 2013, 
Burger King states that “the concentration of ownership by 3G Capital may prevent other 
shareholders from influencing significant corporate decisions”87. In contrast to other public 
firms where ownership is usually rather fragmented, concentrated ownership leads to higher 
influence of shareholders on management (Aguilera & Jackson 2003). Moreover, comparing 
financial versus strategic interests of capital (Aguilera & Jackson (2003), it is likely that 3G 
Capital on the one extreme has financial interests but on the other extreme also possesses 
strategic interests. The strategic interests as for instance the assurance of control rights, might 
thereby be a method to serve the financial interests, which is most likely the achievement of a 
high IRR. Lastly, regarding the maturity, 3G Capital’s capital can be regarded as committed, 
not only due to the high stake of ownership, but also given their long-term investment strategy.  
The second perspective on corporate governance is focused on labor, and analyzes the degree 
of employee influence as well as employee retention at Burger King. The degree of employee’s 
influence is defined as the “ability to influence corporate decision making and to control firm’s 
resources”. The principle of the 3G Capital governance system and culture is build around 
participation. Since the take over, every employee within the corporate headquarter possesses 
great responsibility, whereas roles are usually not double occupied. Besides, each department 
and employee is responsible for sticking to its own budgets. This allows each employee to 
participate in the overall company goals and to have a direct impact. Moreover, due to the open 
office culture, every employee has theoretically access to the top management and can raise 
new ideas or potential for improvement. The flat hierarchy level might even be compared to a 
                                                
83 This reflects the indirect driver: Leverage as a form of controlling managerial behavior. 
84 3G Capital owns approximately 70% of the equity.  
85 Interview: Tim Brueggemann (2015). 
86 TheStreet (2014): http://www.thestreet.com/story/12856055/1/how-burger-kings-brilliant-brazilian-billionaire-
turned-12b-into-22b.html. 




“Start-Up feeling”88. This way employees at Burger King can influence corporate decision 
making. Yet, employee influence and liberty are only given as long as employees perform 
according to their targets. When they reach their proprietary KPIs, control only plays a minor 
role. However, if these goals are not reached, the environment might also get tougher and 
subject to stricter external control89. The fact that employees in the Burger King headquarter 
are usually trained as generalists, possibly negatively contributes towards employee retention, 
as employees might also be able to leverage their skill set in other firms. Yet, employee 
retention is partially secured by the given bonus structure and compensation scheme. Since a 
significant portion of the salary is variable and paid out at the end of the year, employees have 
strong incentives to stay at least until the end of the year90. This will further be discussed in the 
next section that deals with incentives. Furthermore, due to the direct responsibilities and 
accountability for tasks, employees also have a virtual stake in the firm, which is firm specific 
and fosters employee retention (Aguilera & Jackson 2003).  
Thirdly, corporate governance is viewed from the management perspective. The management 
works in close cooperation with 3G Capital, and many of Burger King’s top executives have 
formerly worked for either 3G Capital directly or firms that are associated with the firm. Burger 
King’s CEO for example, Daniel Schwartz, is next to his CEO position at Burger King also a 
director at 3G Capital91. Due to these links, agency conflicts are automatically minimized, as 
management and shareholders are both working for the same firm. Comparing autonomy versus 
commitment, we can say that management is very committed to 3G Capital, whereas the 
relationship towards employees shows mixed results. Due to the less hierarchical culture, the 
relationship is rather committed, yet, regarding personal decisions, management can act very 
autonomous, especially in the beginning of the holding period, where overall FTE headcount 
was reduced from around 800 to nowadays around 300 people in the corporate headquarter in 
Miami92. Moreover, looking at the orientation of managers from the Aguilera & Jackson (2003) 
model, it is clear that Burger King management is strongly working financially oriented. Even 
though the functional area is also important, all types of management jobs, but also less senior 
positions are linked to financial metrics. In this sense Burger King is rather organized as a Start-
Up, instead of a globally operating fast-food giant93. Rather than specializing on tasks, jobs are 
                                                
88 Interview: Tim Brueggemann (2015). 
89 Interview: Tim Brueggemann (2015). 
90 Interview: Tim Brueggemann (2015). 
91 Burger King: Annual Report (2013). 
92 Interview: Tim Brueggemann (2015). 




frequently rotated, which helps to question old patterns and steadily improve things. Next to 
the strong learning curve for young managers, this also comes with the downside that errors are 
committed. The culture of Burger King also allows these errors, yet it is expected that young 
managers learn fast and not commit the same error for a second time94.  
6.2 Incentives 
An important part of the 3G Capital management culture is the component of variable pay. A 
known Brazilian businessman and former billionaire Eike Batista, noted in an interview in 2012 
that the management style of 3G Capital’s founding partner Jorge Lemann is unique as “he 
motivated employees by letting them share the profits –aggressive, but that leads to results”95. 
Assuming that incentives are an element of overall corporate governance (Cf. Cornelli et al. 
2013) and applying the former corporate governance framework from Aguilera & Jackson 
(2003), incentives appear several times in the context of the corporate governance equation. 
Each employee at Burger King96, gets a substantial amount of his salary as a performance based 
variable part that is paid at the end of the year in the form of a bonus. The percentage share 
depends on the level of seniority and can reach from around 15% on the analyst level to up to 
100-200% at the top management level. Middle management positions as “Manager”, 
“Director” and “Vice President” receive up to respectively 30%, 40% and 70%, as a variable 
fraction in addition to their base salary97.  
Firstly, as an element of the stewardship ship theory, financial incentives might provide a 
certain degree of autonomy to managers. In relation to the financial orientation of managers, 
this might facilitate to sometimes “make tough decisions”, for instance regarding personnel 
matters (Aguilera & Jackson 2003, p. 457). In the Burger King context, new managers that 
entered Burger King in the post-acquisition phase were likely less committed and attached to 
employees, as they were not “dependent on firm-specific relationships” (Aguilera & Jackson 
2003, p. 458). Since monetary incentives are attached to corporate global goals, they might 
facilitate making unpopular decisions in order to stick to the budget. On this note, the given 
bonus structure is strongly related to the financial orientation of managers. Through the 
application of “management by objectives”, each person is evaluated according to around 10 
different Key Performance Indicators (KPIs), which are very specific to the respective area and 
                                                
94 Interview: Tim Brueggemann (2015). 
95 http://www.businessinsider.com/3g-capital-jorge-lemann-2015-8. 
96 The information is specific to employees in the corporate headquarter in Miami. It is likely that the compensation 
does not apply for support functions in the HQ as well as restaurant personnel. 




role of the job. These KPIs are tremendously important for the bonus payment, as the 
compliance to reaching these objectives in the end defines the amount of bonus that is paid out. 
In turn, there are so called global targets, whereas each individual contributes, by reaching his 
or her individual KPIs. This way, each individual accounts for a valuable piece of the overall 
value creation puzzle. Therefore, the bonus has a significant motivational effect on everyone in 
the firm, even on lower management positions98. As the bonus is already paid for entry positions 
as for instance analysts, the former effects do not only apply for management positions, but also 
include the labor dimension of Aguilera & Jackson’s (2003) model. As previously noted it 
might turn employee retention less portable and more firm specific, as bonuses are usually paid 
out only once a year.  
Lastly, it is worth looking at an element that is not explicitly included in the governance 
framework of Aguilera & Jackson’s (2003), namely the board of directors. Cornelli et al. (2013) 
investigate boards monitoring activity on CEOs and whether this leads to improved 
performance. The authors regard incentivizing and monitoring of management, as the main 
tasks of the board99. By having a majority stake in the portfolio company, thereby actively 
controlling the board, and having access to soft information about board performance and being 
able to leverage that information, is likely to be an important factor in the context of 3G 
Capital’s acquisition of Burger King.   
                                                
98 Interview: Tim Brueggemann (2015). 




7 Discussion and conclusion 
7.1 Value creation in the Burger King buyout 
Comparing the generated IRR of the Burger King investment (101,06%) with the typical IRR 
goal for successful deals of private equity firms, which lie between 40% and 50%, is a first 
strong indicator for value creation in the Burger King deal. A current empirical study by Lopez-
de-Silianes et al. (2015), which analyzes round 7.500 private equity investments worldwide, 
shows that these claims are in praxis rather wishful thinking, and only represent a minority, 
since only 1 out of 4 deals achieved an IRR exceeding 50%. Besides, comparing the derived 
results, with the original model of Achleitner et al. (2010), shows that the created value in the 
Burger King deal is substantially larger than the average in the respective sample. Whereas the 
money multiple, adds up to 3,5 in the original study, Burger King already achieved a money 
multiple of 7,12 during the first three years of the 3G Capital ownership. By going one step 
further and comparing the generated IRR in the Burger King buyout of 101,06% with the IRR 
that the McDonald’s Corporation (5,92%), Burger King’s biggest competitor, achieved in the 
same time period, further emphasizes the strong financial results that have been achieved at 
Burger King. There is a strong possibility that these results are different when comparing the 
IRR and different value levers with a broader peer group100.  
The presented Burger King buyout, is an example for positive value creation and is in line with 
most authors of the literature review, who claim that private equity investments create value. 
In this sense, the previously presented numbers, support the initial assumption that the Burger 
King deal created significant value for its shareholders, and therefore serves as a good example 
to assess the individual levers that were driving the creation of value101. Yet, further research is 
necessary to fully grasp the creation of value on the level of investors (LPs), who provide capital 
for private equity funds. An extension of the model provided by Achleitner et al. (2010) that 
accounts for the fees that are paid to GPs is thereby desirable in future research102 . The 
following discussion will further critically discuss the dynamics behind the primary levers and 
subsequently debate the two most important secondary levers in the Burger King deal.  
                                                
100 Future research in this field is desirable, that possibly accounts for a larger set/sample of competitors.  
101This paper does not provide empirical support for the general hypothesis, that private equity creates value. By 
applying the previously introduced methodology, it is solely shown how value can be assessed and how this can 
be composed into several drivers. 
102 Note that this is not an easy task, as most private equity firms do not have the obligation nor incentives to fully 




7.2 Discussion of direct drivers 
Looking at Figure 3103, which depicts the composition of the IRR, gives a first indication that 
value creation in private equity might hardly be explainable through only one driver. 
Comparing the effect of the value drivers relatively, shows that there is not one driver that 
explains the absolute majority of created value. In contrast to (Achleitner et al. 2010) who 
explain 32% by leverage104, this paper found a slightly lower proportion in the Burger King 
deal, where the effect of leverage accounts for roughly 29%. Instead, in the example of Burger 
King, the most dominant driver on a relative basis, is the multiple effect, which accounts for 
32,47%. This is 14,47 percentage points higher than in the original model. Surprisingly, the two 
operational improvement drivers in the previous analysis are both relatively lower, compared 
to the average findings of the Achleitner et al. (2010) model. Whereas, the original framework 
found that EBITDA improvements were the second strongest driver, accounting for almost 
31%, the case of Burger King explained only around 17% with the enhancement of EBITDA 
within the three years holding period. To sum up, Figure 5 summarizes the differences between 
the respective relative value contribution of each driver, between Burger King and the sample 
average of Achleitner et al. (2010).  
 
Figure 5: Relative value contribution of value drivers (Burger King vs. Achleitner 2010) 
Despite the concerns of some authors, who only regard the improvement in operating 
performance as a driver of value creation (Bergström et al. 2007), the formerly analyzed case 
study, gives an indication that the effect of leverage contributed to an increase in equity value 
and firm value respectively. Controversially to common literature on secondary buyouts (SBO), 
as for example Achleitner & Figge (2014), who propose that value creation in SBOs is mainly 
                                                
103 In chapter 5.2.4 Relative importance of drivers. 
104 Note that leverage accounts for an even larger proportion in large transactions (>100 m�). The relative effect 
of leverage in comparison to other drivers is approximately 38% of the overall value creation (Capital Dynamics 























































driven by leverage, here leverage seems to play an important, yet secondary role, as it accounts 
for only 29% of the IRR. Furthermore, it is important to note that these results only measure 
the impact of tax shields on firm value, while neglecting the potential importance that derive 
from managerial objectives of debt, which lower the flexibility of management and therefore 
potentially increase the organizational efficiency (Jensen 1986). Even though debt might lead 
to a more efficient use of cash flows, thereby lowering potential agency costs, the optimal 
choice of capital105 might create another potential agency problem, whereas an overly levered 
capital structure could adversely affect the investors of the fund (LPs). Ignoring the 
aforementioned factors might pose a possible limitation on the quantitative model. 
Nevertheless, this paper discusses the behavioral effect in the context of secondary levers as a 
part of corporate governance. To sum up, it can be referred back to the first proposition and 
said that leverage is an important direct value driver in the Burger King buyout. The argument, 
higher interest tax shields are neutralized by higher costs of debt, which some authors pose on 
leverage (e.g. Long and Ravenscraft (1993) and Samdani, Butler et al. (2001), cited after Loos 
2005), can therefore be neglected for the Burger King buyout106.  
On a relative basis, the multiple effect has the strongest impact on value creation. This is partly 
contradicting the initial expectation that the operational improvement effect has the strongest 
impact on value creation. However, given the various possible explanations for the multiple 
effect107, it is unclear which of the explaining factors have higher weight. Besides, it is likely 
that the multiple effect already includes future improvements in operating performance. The 
comparison with McDonald’s suggests that the contribution of increased market multiples is 
rather low, since the multiple effect for Burger King’s major competitor only accounts for 
approximately 1% of value creation. It is therefore likely that as previously supposed, optimized 
corporate scope and higher future expected cash flows108  play a major role in explaining the 
multiple effect. This in turn might pronounce the added value that 3G Capital contributed as a 
private equity investor109. 
                                                
105 Note that the capital structure is assumed to vary within the holding period of the private equity firm. 
106 This can be related to several factors, as for instance financial engineering skills of 3G Capital, in order to 
finding the best debt/equity ratio. Or also favorable terms and conditions that PE firms receive on the debt 
market as they are repeat buyers (Berg & Gottschalg 2005). 
107 As depicted in Appendix 4, i.e. market valuation, deal-making capabilities, optimized corporate scope, etc.  
108 Cf. Achleitner et al. (2010, p. 21) who propose that “the higher multiple at exit could be an indication oft he 
improved future prospects fort he company”. 
109 It has to be noted that the former analysis does not show that the multiple effect is significantly higher in private 




Moreover, it is suggested that future research splits the multiple effect into extrinsic and 
intrinsic factors. Extrinsic factors are according to the definition of Berg & Gottschalg (2005) 
attributable to the influence of the PE firm, whereas intrinsic factors would have also appeared 
in the firm, without the investment of the buyout firm. Changes in market valuations are for 
instance intrinsic, as they would have also appeared without the active participation of the 
private equity firm110. A suggested modification to the Achleitner et al. (2010) model is to 
calculate a second version of the multiple effect, using the multiple of the peer group111. On the 
one hand, the difference of the EV increase from the unlevered Burger King multiple (13,86) 
to the unlevered peer group or competitor multiple (McDonald’s: 10,34) is then illustrating the 
value that is attributable to specific skills or competences of Burger King and 3G Capital. On 
the other hand, applying the unlevered peer group multiple, depicts the part of the multiple 
effect that it is attributable to changes in market multiples. Applying these changes might turn 
the quantitative model into a better forecast model instead of “only” analyzing past 
performance. When applying this amendment, 33,75% of the multiple effect are attributable to 
changes in market valuation, whereas 66,25% are subject to all other changes, as illustrated in 
Appendix 15112. Increased future prospects of Burger King seem to be the strongest factors for 
the higher multiple of Burger King. Yet, future research is necessary to verify these 
hypotheses113.  
Henceforth, this paper views the multiple effect as a direct driver, since the improvements do 
not seem to be purely luck but in parts are attributable to skill and competence of the private 
equity firm. Consequently, Proposition 2 can be confirmed as the multiple effect generates 
value. An extension to the model of Berg & Gottschalk (2005) is the suggestion that financial 
arbitrage (the multiple effect) can be in parts regarded as a value creating driver. Thereby the 
question if financial arbitrage should be denoted as value capturing or creating is subject to 
individual definition, whereas the contextualization of Berg & Gottschalg (2005) that the 
multiple effect does not directly increase the financial results of a firm, is acknowledged114. 
                                                
110 A synonymous but reverse argumentation would be that a change in market valuation is an exogenous factors, 
whereas an optimized corporate scope is endogenous and subject to the skill and know-how in the portfolio 
company, that has probably partially been transferred from the buyout firm. 
111 It hast o be taken into account, that this also has to be the unlevered EV/EBITDA multiple. In the McDonald 
example the EV/EBITDA multiple is 10,34 for the unlevered firm and 13,53 for the levered firm.  
112 Here the market multiple is only calculated by taking the unlevered EV/EBITDA multiple of McDonald’s. 
Further improvements of this suggestion should rather consider a wider peer group. 
113 This is for instance feasible when applying the Achleitner et al. (2010) model to the whole peer group. 
Comparing these results to Burger King might present more representative results. 




Comparing the operational improvement effect of Burger King to the empirical results, derived 
by Achleitner et al. (2010) showed that operational improvement was relatively smaller in the 
Burger King deal, whereas it strongly exceeded the average empirical results of the study, as 
depicted in Appendix 16. Besides, the results were compared to Burger King’s strongest 
competitor, McDonald’s, where both operational improvement effects, were lower in terms of 
money multiple as depicted in Appendix 14. The comparison with McDonald’s supports the 
results of Cressy et al. (2007), who found that “operating profitability of companies backed by 
PE firms was greater than that of comparable non-buyout companies” (Cressy et al. 2007, p.19). 
The authors also found that industry specialization is a differential factor in private equity 
investments that constitutes a competitive advantage. 3G Capital’s sector expertise in the food 
& beverage industry, as well as it’s focus on operational excellence115  can be a possible 
explanation for a competitive advantage that constitutes the superior results compared to other 
transactions (Cf. Cressy et al. 2007).  
Both, the comparison with McDonald’s as well as benchmarking the operating profitability 
results with the empirical results of Achleitner et al. (2010), indicate that the operational results 
at Burger King are not random and attributable to certain skills or capabilities that 3G Capital 
transferred to the firm. Based on the indirect drivers that support the direct ones, this thesis 
qualitatively showed that these results are to a certain degree attributable to the participation 
and support of 3G Capital. Therefore, it can be concluded that the results seem to be extrinsic 
to Burger King (cf. Berg & Gottschalg 2005). Moreover, Loos (2005, p.20) defines support 
from the private equity investor as improving “resource efficiency” or “resource 
redeployment”. By contributing knowledge and expertise, 3G Capital contributed to the 
positive development of it’s portfolio company. Yet, only based on the Burger King example 
and comparing it to one competitor and other PE transactions it cannot be statistically proven 
that the superior results are only attributable to 3G Capital116. In order to make a more accurate 
statement, future research might address the operational improvement approach of 3G Capital, 
by analyzing a broader set of portfolio companies and comparing them respectively with their 
peer group. 
Opposed to the findings of Bonini (2012), who provide statistical evidence that SBOs do not 
significantly improve operational performance, this paper showed that the Burger King deal 
                                                
115 3G Capital (2015): Company website. 
116 The qualitative analysis of Burger King before the buyout suggest that Burger King did not possess any 




generated substantial amount of value through operational improvement and other levers that 
are not related to leverage. Therefore Proposition 3: Value is created through improved 
operations is confirmed, through both EBITDA improvements and the cash flow effect, 
whereas EBITDA improvements are solely achieved through an enhanced EBITDA margin. 
Although, future enhancements through revenue are likely, so far in the considered holding 
period, sales were declining and therefore not positively contributing to value creation. In turn, 
the cash flow effect also contributed to operational value creation, first of all through dividend 
payments and second of all through debt repayments. These debt repayments do not increase 
the enterprise value, but rather increase the relative weight of equity. Since the cash flow is 
derived and dependent from different factors as EBITDA, working capital, CAPEX and also 
tax and interest payments, the effect measured through the Achleitner et al. (2010) model can 
not purely be attributable to improved asset utilization and is therefore not mutually exclusive 
to other factors. In the ideal case it would only include changes to the FCF, after the EBITDA 
in the Profit & Loss (P&L) statement. To correctly measure the effect that was previously 
described in the literature review it should in theory only rely on asset related measures as 
changes in working capital, depreciation and CAPEX. Therefore, this paper proposed two 
alternative ways to measure the cash flow effect. Further research might account for the 
applicability and validity of these two alternatives.  
Another interesting field for future research is the analysis of the investment strategy of 3G 
Capital, which would have extended the scope of this paper. It is thereby interesting to 
investigate if 3G Capital with the follow-up acquisition of Tim Horton’s intended to pursue a 
so-called “buy-and-build” strategy (Cf. Loos 2005). After analyzing the Burger King deal it is 
assumed that the long-term approach of 3G Capital includes future acquisitions117. These 
acquisitions enable the realization of synergies after improvements through first further cost 
reductions and second organic top-line growth are already utilized and not able to provide the 
demanded future improvements on a stand-alone basis118.  
Finally, once more it has to be stressed that the aforementioned different drivers are not 
mutually exclusive, but rather interrelated. Since this paper only analyzes the first three years 
of 3G Capital’s involvement at Burger King it is very likely that the whole operational 
                                                
117 Future research might address this approach and analyze it from a strategic perspective. My assumption is that 
3G Capital is optimizing its portfolio companies first internally and as further improvements are not feasible 
anymore, they continue buying related firms, in order to improving the new company and to aim for synergies.  
118 Note that the acquisition of Heinz provides a similar pattern where first costs were reduced, second sales were 
spurred and third Kraft was acquired and merged with Heinz. A similar strategy is visible at ABInbev which is 




improvement potential has not yet been exploited. Therefore, it is likely that the multiple effect 
already accounts for and anticipates future improvements in EBITDA and cash flows. 
Moreover, referring back to Jensen (1986) leverage is likely to have a positive behavioral effect 
on operating performance.  
7.3 Discussion of indirect drivers 
The two identified main indirect drivers, corporate governance and management incentives, are 
both important to explain value creation in the Burger King deal. Whereas they are not 
quantitatively verifiable, their existence is in parts likely to explain the results of the former 
direct drivers. The analysis of these drivers are consistent with former research, which found 
that corporate governance and incentives are a possible explanation for success in private equity 
investments. The fact that shareholders of Burger King are at the same time the ones that are 
responsible for managing the company, provides strong incentives to aim for maximizing firm 
value, which is why Proposition 4: Indirect drivers play a role in explaining value creation in 
leveraged buyouts, is supported (Cf. Cornelli & Karakas 2008). Both incentives, as well as 
corporate governance are thereby relevant to explain value creation. On the one hand since both 
reduce agency cost. On the other hand, incentives may increase employee motivation and 
changes in corporate governance may support active board involvement (Cf. Kaplan & 
Strömberg 2009). 
As formerly stated in the literature review, private equity firms often redesign the structure of 
corporate governance, which may change the dynamics of agency costs (Kaplan 1989b). Since 
3G Capital owns more than 70% of the stocks, Burger King is a “controlled company” 
constituted under the rules of the New York Stock Exchange, which exempts the firm from a 
variety of corporate governance requirements. Therefore, the majority of the board members 
does not consist of independent directors. Besides the company does neither have to have a 
“corporate governance and nominating committee” nor a “compensation committee”, which 
provides more freedom and flexibility to both Burger King’s board and management as well as 
it’s controlling shareholder 3G Capital119. In accordance with Cornelli & Karakaş (2008) one 
might therefore question if firms as Burger King, which are controlled by private equity firms 
actually need a board of directors. This claim gets even more relevant while questioning the 
main task of the board of directors, which is to ensure that management acts in the best interest 
of it’s shareholders (Cornelli et al. 2013). The question if less necessity for board control on 
                                                




management frees capacities of directors to focus on strategic topics (for instance, future 
follow-up acquisitions) is left for future research. 
In general, and especially in the case of Burger King, the private equity fund 3G Capital is 
providing the majority of the board members and has completely changed the composition of 
the board, starting after the successful acquisition. Daniel Schwartz is therefore not only the 
CEO of the company, but also a director at the controlling shareholder 3G Capital. Due to the 
affiliation of management and ownership 120 , concentrated ownership but also powerful 
incentives, the supervision role of the board to make sure that management acts is the best 
interest is becoming obsolete. Yet, this does not mean that the board is redundant, but rather 
the opposite as the board of Burger King becomes an advisor instead of a supervisor, which is 
comparable to the thoughts of Cornelli & Karakas (2008). Other papers argue that an 
“unsufficient representation of independent directors” can be dangerous and lead to failure of 
monitoring management sufficiently (Desender et al. 2013, p. 824). This may jeopardize the 
anticipated positive effect of private equity firms on governance. Yet, as management and 
shareholders are closely affiliated at Burger King, control plays a less important role. In turn 
the concerns of Desender et al. (2013) can be disregarded.  
Ultimately it is the corporate governance framework that provides the direction for the 
company, whereas incentives impact the alignment of interests between management and 
shareholders. Both of the indirect drivers contribute to reduce the loss of value through agency 
costs. Beyond that, incentives also positively contribute to value creation by motivating 
management and employees (Cf. Easterwood et al. 1989). As incentives allow the distribution 
of profits between shareholders and management, the negative “wealth consequences of 
managerial decisions” are internalized, which “can enhance the productivity of the firm” (Lehn 
& Poulsen 1989, p. 773). Although, the motivational aspect of incentives is not quantitatively 
provable, the interview with one of Burger King’s employees revealed that the bonus provides 
strong incentives to stick to individual budgets, which contributes to overall cost reduction and 
value creation at the firm level. Finally, Loos (2005) compares the corporate governance 
transformation in buyouts to start-up firms, as management is incentivized with shares. In the 
Burger King example governance does not only change the remuneration and equity 
                                                
120 3G Capital uses an internal talent pool to occupy management positions. Management and board positions are 
usually staffed with either direct partners of 3G Capital or other people that have proven themselves in current or 
former portfolio companies (Interview with Tim Brueggemann 2015). Before Daniel Schwartz, another partner of 
3G Capital, Bernardo Hees, was the CEO of Burger King. He left Burger King in 2013 to pursue the CEO position 




participation of managers and employees, but also changes the organizational culture, for 
example through the reduced spending behavior of employees121. This might also be related to 
the motivational efficiency impact of high debt levels (Cf. Jensen 1986). 
7.4  Concluding  remarks  
The first contribution of this paper towards existing theory of value creation in private equity 
is the provision of a comprehensive and well structured literature review. The literature review 
summarizes empirical and qualitative findings and includes traditional as well as up-to-date 
papers that deal with the respective topic. Furthermore, this paper contributes to academic 
literature by applying a specific empirical value creation model to a single firm. Whereas the 
direct drivers show how value has been created, the following debate about indirect drivers 
allows to understand the specific dynamics that are changing in the buyout context. Thereafter 
both incentives and corporate governance appear to strongly contribute towards value creation. 
Furthermore, this thesis clears the way to use the analyzed model as a forecasting tool, whereas 
the original model only analyzed a sample of transactions that were previously already divested. 
An opportunity for future research is to apply the model on a wider selection of companies, as 
this paper only analyzed one company and one single industry. The analysis of the acquisition 
of Burger King in particular, reveals several new areas for future research. On a general basis 
it raises the question if private equity can be seen as a superior organizational form, in the sense 
of a “corporate headquarters” as presumed many years ago by Jensen (1889). A suggestion for 
future research is to revisit the past statement of Jensen (1989) in today’s business context. 
Moreover, future research might address the applicability and function of individual 
management tools that are leveraged at Burger King, as for instance zero-based-budgeting as a 
budgeting tool and pay-for-performance remuneration schemes.  
Next to the contribution to academia, the thesis also contributes valuable insights to managerial 
practices. Given the substantial value creation in the Burger King deal across all kinds of direct 
drivers, 3G Capital’s acquisition of Burger King is a useful case to analyze value creation in 
private equity. It is thereby especially interesting how other private equity firms but also public 
firms can learn from the given value improvements at Burger King. Even though, Lopez-de-
Silanes et al. (2015) state that actions and competences of private equity firms do not appear to 
be easily repeatable or scalable, the detailed analysis of indirect drivers facilitates to understand 
how value can be created. These findings might therefore allow also public firms to apply some 
                                                




of the previously mentioned corporate governance and incentive concepts, and therefore also 
accelerate value creation in other firms. Finally, private equity firms may apply the provided 
extension of the Achleitner et al. (2010) model and therefore more accurately forecast and 
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Appendix 2: Structure of the literature review and the subsequent analysis 
 





Appendix 3: Overview of the main steps in a buyout process  
 
 



































Appendix 4: Value generation in LBOs after Berg & Gottschalg (2005) 
 
 
















































Appendix 5: Dimensions of corporate governance  
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Since the peer group Beta is based on a value from November 2015, market risk premium and risk-free rate 




2009A 2010A 2011A 2012A 2013A 2014F 2015F 2016F 2017F 2018F
Total&revenue 2.537 2.502 2.340 1.971 1.146 1.200,1 1.240,4 1.282,4 1.325,9 1.371,2
YoY#growth C1,4% C6,5% C15,8% C41,8% 4,69% 3,36% 3,38% 3,40% 3,41%
Franchise&and&property&revenues 657 663 701 802 923,6 976,3 1.015,5 1.056,3 1.098,7 1.142,9
YoY#growth 1% 6% 14% 15% 5,70% 4,02% 4,02% 4,02% 4,02%
Company&restaurant&revenues 1.881 1.839 1.639 1.169 222,7 223,8 224,9 226,1 227,2 228,3
YoY .2% .11% .29% .81% 0,50% 0,50% 0,50% 0,50% 0,50%
Source:#Annual#report#2013,#Bloomberg#2015
Number&of&restaurants&forecast
2009A 2010A 2011A 2012A 2013A 2014F 2015F 2016F 2017F 2018F
Number&of&restaurants 12.078 12.251 12.512 12.997 13.667 14.372,0 14.873,2 15.391,9 15.928,8 16.484,5
YoY#growth 1,4% 2,1% 3,9% 5,2% 5,2% 3,5% 3,5% 3,5% 3,5%
Franchise&&owned 10.656 10.907 11.217 12.579 13.615,0 14.320,0 14.821,2 15.339,9 15.876,8 16.432,5
YoY#growth 2% 3% 12% 8% 5,2% 3,5% 3,5% 3,5% 3,5%
Company&rowned 1.422 1.344 1.295 418 52,0 52,0 52,0 52,0 52,0 52,0




2009A 2010A 2011A 2012A 2013A 2014F 2015F 2016F 2017F 2018F
Total
YoY#growth 0,5% 0,5% 0,5% 0,5% 0,5%
Franchise&&owned
YoY#growth 0,5% 0,5% 0,5% 0,5% 0,5%
Company&rowned


































Appendix 12: Subdrivers of the operational improvement effect 
 
 













In)$US)million FY)2009 FY)10)(Half) FY)2010 FY)2011 FY)2012 FY)2013
30/06/09 30/06/10 2010J12J31 2011J12J31 2012J12J31 2013J12J31
Market)Capitalization 2.327,9 2.287,1 n/a n/a 5.757,9 8.050,4
!!"!Cash!&!Equivalents 121,7 187,6 207,0 459,0 546,7 786,9
!!+!Preferred!Equity 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
!!+!Minority!Interest 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
!!+!Total!Debt 888,9 826,3 2.792,1 3.139,2 3.049,3 3.037,0
Enterprise)Value 3.095,1 2.925,8 n/a n/a 8.260,5 10.300,5
Source:(Bloomberg(2015
Entry Exit Difference Effect
Sales 2.502 1146,3 *1.356 *2.055,36
Margin2 18% 51% 34% 7.157,01
Combination *3.878,26
EBITDA 444,60 588,00 143 1.223,38
DCF$%$valuation
Cash%Flow%statement
2010A 2011A 2012A 2013A 2014F 2015F 2016F 2017F 2018F TV
EBIT 333 362,5 417,7 522,2 606 672 713 755 799
! Tax%on%EBIT%(T%x%EBIT) 83 91 104 131 151 168 178 189 200
= NOPLAT 250 272 313 392 454 504 535 567 600
+ Depreciation 49 136 114 66 69 72 74 77 79
! d%Investment%in%Working%Capital !58 127 !151 !93 7 5 5 5 5
! Capital%Expenditures 150 82 70 26 56 58 60 62 65
Cash$flow$to$the$firm$(1)$ %73 195 133 6 9 9 9 10 211











Appendix 14: Times money multiple of Burger King and McDonald’s 
 
 
Burger King value creation drivers (Money multiple) 
 
Source: own calculation 
 
 
McDonald’s value creation drivers (Money multiple) 
 








Appendix 15: Extension to the multiple effect applied to Burger King and McDonalds’s,  
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Appendix 16: Times money multiple of Burger King vs. Achleitner et al. (2010)  
 
 
Burger King value creation drivers (Times money multiple) 
 
Source: own calculation 
 
The rationale behind the times money multiple is the following. Overall cash flows at the divestment stage are 
accounting for around $8.542 million which also includes the initial investment of $1.200 million. The times money 
multiple reflects the added value that is achieved, therefore calculating the difference of $8.542 million and $1.200 
million yields in $7.342 million. This can be calculated with the times money multiple (6,12 * 1200).  
 
Achleitner et al (2010): Value creation drivers across the entire sample  
 




































































Appendix 17: Interview with Tim Bruggemann, conducted via skype on November 29th 2015 
 
Qualitative interpretation of direct drivers  
 
1)   As previously explained, this thesis assesses different drivers of value creation. Which of 
the following drivers is likely to have a role in the Burger King buyout? 
 
•   I am not an expert with the effect of leverage and multiple effect 
•   Operational improvement is very likely to have the strongest impact. One major 
contribution towards the improvement at the operational level is ZBB (Zero based 
budgeting). Therefore, Burger King saves millions of dollars annually und can thereby 
annually achieve an EBITDA growth of around 12% to 15% next to the top line revenue 
growth 
 
2)   How can you increase value through EBITDA improvements? What are the relevant 
factors? 
•   First of all, the culture and human capital factor at Burger King. People are from the 
same sort and are generally very motivated, it is a fast pace environment 
•   You are not stopped by internal walls or hit your head on walls like in other big 
corporations, through hierarchic structures 
•   The working is not even as in consulting but more likely comparable to a Start-Up, we 
have very flat hierarchies, even as an analyst when you have an idea you can get directly 
go to the board and bring up your idea directly without any barriers 
•   Communication and the structure is very open, and this is also meant like this, there are 
no barriers like you have to ask for an appointment, you just walk to the C-suite (CFO, 
CEO, etc), they also have a open desk, and you can directly talk to them in the open 
space or in an extra room 
•   Yet, the people that are working there are similar to people who work in management 
consultancies with many “all-rounders”  
•   My fear of leaving consulting and moving towards corporate was accompanied by the 
fear of hitting against walls, but this is not at all the case at Burger King, everything is 
directed towards efficiency 
•   The people are very young and flexible, also older employees who were there before the 
take over are keeping up and motivated for change 
 
3)   You said that the EBITDA margin was growing by 10-12% annually on average. My 
question now is if the cost saving potential is already “harvested” until 2013 or are there 
still further improvements possible? 
•   No I wouldn’t say that the saving potential is already over. There is still further 
potential, not only with the synergy potential that emerges with the merger with Tim 
Hortons, but also on a stand-alone basis. Not only through cost savings but also through 
growth on the top line.  
•   The difference here to other PE firms, is the careful consideration to do both, to grow 
on the top line, but also to exploit on the cost side, but by no means on a short sided 
way 
•   In terms of cost cutting, Burger King and 3G thereby put a lot of effort on long-term 
sustainability. We can not only save cost or skip investment since they do not just want 




a sustainable way, and therefore you can achieve the EBITDA growth that we can 
currently see in the financials of Burger King  
 
Explanation for value creation and indirect drivers  
 
4)   Is there a 3G method that might also be comparable to other deals? In the Kraft & Heinz 
deal there seems to be a similar approach?  
•   Yes, there is a similar pattern, in the first years they saved costs through ZBB both with 
Burger King as well as with Heinz, and in the following years they try to further increase 
revenue in a sustainable long-term form 
•   The long term investment horizon allows a culture that is promoting to act in the best 
interest for the company instead of aiming at short-term earnings 
•   Everything that helps in short-term and harms in long-term will be avoided 
 
 
5)   How does Zero based budgeting work at Burger King? 
•   Zero based budgeting at Burger King is less a budgeting tool but more a philosophy  
•   If you look at zero based budgeting it is not the budgeting process that is behind it. You 
rather have to look at the philosophy behind it and everything that comes along with it 
•   What comes along with it is for example the compliance to the budgets, the economy in 
employee’s mindset 
•   Each year each department or cost center has to define from 0 what kind of expenses it 
will have, thereby everyone has to plan in detail what he will spend, for example for 
travelling. On this basis the budgets are defined, relatively independent from the former 
year 
•   Then it is important that everyone is responsible for sticking to its own budget 
•   IF you do not stick to it, it will reduce your bonus 
•   There is also a global budget, which is the sum of all the individual budgets and the 
global goal is to reduce the global budget year by year, for instance it was $100 million 
in the former year, then in the next year it is cut by $10 million, so everyone needs to 
deal with 10% less. Thereby everyone has to see how to cut its budget 
•   It is not only how you build this budget and on what it is composed of, at Burger King 
it is rather a culture and way of thinking to treat money as if it were your own money 
•   So if you are for example travelling, you might take a hotel that is a bit cheaper, or just 
do a trip if you actually think it adds value. Thereby it prevents situations where an 
employee wants to reach his frequent traveler status at the end of the year and is 
therefore doing more trips 
•   With ZBB this does not happen, since it is a culture, the other employees also see when 
you “waste money”, and this might have a negative tone  
 
6)   How are incentives used, do they play a role in compensating employees at Burger King? 
•   It depends on the level for instance as analyst (15%), manager (30%), director (40%) 
vice president (70%). So you get your basis salary and then up to 15 , 30 or 70 as 
variable pay 
•   This can get up to 100% to 200% for the management level,  
•   I would say that the variable pay/bonus has a huge motivational effect on everyone, also 
on the lower levels, when you get 30% as a manager on top of your salary this is still 
huge 




•   In this sense our MBOs (Management by Objective) come in play 
•   Thereby we have firm wide objectives, which then are broke down to the different 
management levels and functions. 
•   You have goals in your area that you can directly influence, which are then rolled up to 
the global goals. 
•   For your bonus structure you thereby have your 10 own KPIs, that are important for 
the area where you work, this can for instance be projects or other simple measures 
•   So everyone is working towards this individual goals, and have responsibility 
•   In general, I would say that everyone has a critical function in the overall system, there 
is no function that is redundant 
•   With the variable pay you make sure that everyone is aiming at reaching their own goals 
and thereby contributing to the overall goals, the overall goal is in general a firm wide 
EBITDA,  
•   To reach this EBITDA there are many different elevating screws 
•   Depending on the function, a finance guy might have goals that are more directed 
towards cost reduction, whereas a sales person is more responsible for increasing the 
top line 
•   All these different parts have to come together to reach the overall goal, everyone and 
everything is thereby important 
 
7)   Academic research has shown that private equity has an impact on the principal agent 
theory, whereas governance and incentives come into play. How are both concepts applied 
at Burger King? 
•   We have to be careful here, the governance does not mean that you are all the time 
controlled 
•   You are responsible for what you do and people assume that you know what you are 
doing and that you work responsibly. At the end of the year the results count, if you do 
not reach your goal at the end of the year, we have to understand what went wrong 
•   But here also comes recruiting into play, since it is important for us to hire the right 
people, and talent management is a high priority you cannot forget the governance but 
you don’t need a governance function since everyone is looking for himself and his 
environment and therefore make sure to do the right thing 
•   But this is also possible here since we are very lean and slim structured, so that we do 
not have 100 thousands of people.  
•   In Miami we are not even 300 people, inclusive the support functions, this is not a 
“corporate beast “, where you need a whole institution to control the people 
•   Since everyone has his clear tasks and own responsibility you are rather controlled by 
the person you are reporting to 
 
8)   Did many people directly come from 3G or were rather external people hired after the 
acquisition in 2010? 
 
•   Some people are actually directly coming from 3G, as for example our CEO Daniel 
Schwartz 
•   But the most of the people come from the 3G Capital network, which means that they 
are not directly 3G Capital employees but rather people from their network 
•   Since many young people came and a lot of “fresh blood” came into the company there 




•   We have a very steep learning curve, which means that after 2 years you can by far not 
reach the full potential that is achievable on the operational improvement side 
•   In year 1 you start cutting costs, but in the coming years when the new staff build their 
own know-how, then everything is getting even better and more efficient 
•   The continuous improvement is also achieved by the goal setting structure, where 
Management by Objectives is used. This means that your goals are higher each year. 
Even if the goals seem initially not reachable, you have to find a creative way to reach 
them  
•   Basically the goals are way to high and in the beginning of the year it really seems 
impossible 
•   So you have to think deeply how to achieve those goals. Therefore, we guarantee 
continuous improvement while always challenging the “Status-quo”. The 
aforementioned MBO also guarantee that each employee is challenging himself 
continuously, and the current status 
•   On this note we try to avoid routine and always develop. Everything what we do is 
aiming towards creating value 
•   Due to the flat hierarchies and many personal changes we create permanent change 
•   If you arrive at the point where you perfectly know your role you will be promoted to a 
new role. Often you are even promoted before, if you are ready. The idea here is that 
you are promoted when you have the potential to do the new role, not when you are are 
ready to do the role. This means that you are always growing into your role. When you 
have a new role, you have to grow there again, (this not necessarily always comes with 
a promotion, roles are also changed without) 
•   This means in the new role that you do new mistakes and have to learn. But this is done 
on purpose to make sure that no routines are build. What stays are best practices of a 
role that are then distributed to the new person that is taking the role. Therefore we 
avoid the formation of bad habits 
•   Part of the culture is that you have many generalists, of course also some specialists, 
whom we urgently need in some functions, but the most part are generalists 
•   Due to the different backgrounds of the people, often completely different industries new 
opportunities emerge, as for instance in a situation where people find: “Look we did 
this before in another project, lets see if this is also applicable here”.  
•   This in a sense is related to the Start-Up culture that we have 
•   I am at Burger King since approximately 2,5 years and already in my third role, which 
always came along with a promotion (yet this might not be the case for everyone)  
 
9)   What is the recruiting scheme of 3G Capital, is this specific? 
 
•   Our idea is that we generally do not hire people with knowledge, but rather people with 
potential 
•   This way we hire people that we can form and that are dynamic and aiming for change, 
instead of always just following old processes and habits 
 
10)  What is the background of the people? Are many like you coming from consulting 
companies? 
 
•   No, most of the people are not direct hires like me. The biggest part of people is coming 




•   It is a pyramid, you have many fast promotions, but up there the air is getting thinner, 
that is why we need to fill the pyramid at the analyst level  
 
11)  Regarding corporate governance, what do you think is the impact of the board at Burger 
King? Does the fact that most of the board members are from 3G Capital or affiliates play 
a role?  
•   Of course it helps that 3G Capital is the main investor, therefore we have a lot of 
freedom 
•   Also given that the other investors are mainly affiliates of 3G or at least people that 
believe in the 3G culture and philosophy 
•   This is why you have a lot of freedom and not the corporate governance claw that means 
you always have to justify things  
•   A lot of freedom is given to employees, and it is okey if it doesn’t work immediately.  
•   However, this does not mean we have a free pass. If the results are not there, this can 
be an absolutely tough environment. If results are not there, pressure on managers and 
employees is very high 
•   This pressure can for example come from the board, especially, Alex Behring, an 
extreme clever guy, who is also managing partner at 3G. He is the one that is setting 
the tone. Moreover,  he is extremely demanding and when there is need for change he 
sets the tone. For example when we had a good year, he is coming to say “ good guys, 
this year was a great year, but lets not rest on these results and further go on, next year 
your targets are 50% higher. 
•   Alex Behring is the one that is bringing the pressure from top to down through the 
organization 
•   Since the board is very 3G heavy, you have more the pressure to live this 3G culture. 
But it is not the case that the board is questioned or something like this. Everyone that 
is behind the board is “board in” – they believe in this culture and philosophy 
•   Alex Behring has for example the “C suite” below him and that report to him. But you 
can say that he is always informed and knows what is going on 
•   He is also involved in other 3G Capital owned firms, but he is spending a lot of time, 
with the individual companies and also the respective markets.  
•   He is the one that is setting the tone in the board, and that directly influences our “C 
suite. He has a big interest to see that the company is running well, and for example 
Daniel Schwartz is one of his direct protégés. Behring also took Daniel to Burger King, 
first as a CFO and later made him CEO after the former CEO Bernardo went to Heinz.  
•   But	   this	   is	   part	   of	   the	   game,	   that	   talents	   that	   proved	   themselves	   to	   be	   are	   in	   an	  
emergency	  promoted122	  to	   leading	  positions,	  but	  this	  way	   it	   is	  ensured	  that	  things	  
work	  as	  it	  is	  intended	  by	  3G	  Capital	  
                                                
122 This comes from the German translation and is inspired by the former comment that people with potential are 
promoted before they are ready, which is why they are frequently overwhelmed  
